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Abstract 
 
The advancement in small unmanned aerial vehicle (SUAV) technology has 
brought a new revolution in the military domain. Their uses have become more 
synonymous with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. Concerns over 
their flight test safety and accountability have been addressed in multiple policies to 
mitigate mishaps and increase proper accountability. However, current DoD and FAA 
mandated regulations and policies concerning UAV flight tests are sometimes considered 
slow and time-consuming, which may lead to delays in UAV research and development.  
This study explores the quantitative and qualitative measure of benefits associated 
with an abbreviated flight test process for SUAVs. Specifically, it examines the current 
agreement between two major USAF research centers regarding the SUAV flight test 
approval process. This research utilized high-level multidisciplinary approaches and 
techniques including qualitative cost-benefit analysis, interviews, value stream mapping 
(VSM) analysis, and heuristic risk analysis to evaluate the current-state process. The 
findings conclude that there is a slight economic cost and schedule savings in an 
abbreviated process. Additionally, this research finds no correlation between SUAV 
flight mishaps and system maturity. This research proposes using a streamlined process 
for additional safety reviews to eliminate non-value added process steps considered 
unnecessary due to the nature of the SUAV complexity. Furthermore, this study 
recommends using a decision rule matrix based on the total cost of the SUAV and its 
weight and energy at impact for choosing an abbreviated flight test safety review process. 
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 1 
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE FLIGHT TEST APPROVAL PROCESS AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS: A METHODOLOGIAL APPROACH TO CAPTURE AND 
EVALUATE HIDDEN COSTS AND VALUE IN THE OVERALL PROCESS 
I.  Introduction 
“For once you have tasted flight, you will walk the earth with your eyes tuned skywards, 
for there you have been and there you will long to return.” – Leonardo da Vinci 
 
 
Historically, humans have approached flight test process and evaluation with 
scientific methods since the early days of aviation. Mankind has always been fascinated 
with flight and the ability to control the sky. Examples range from early attempts such as 
Greek mythology’s Icarus’ wings to real scientific approaches like Leonardo da Vinci’s 
ornithopter. By the late 19th century, the race was on to build the world’s first powered 
and controlled flying machine. Numerous flight designs and tests were done by scientists, 
engineers, and flight enthusiasts competing for the title of the first to sustain heavier-
than-air human flight; and in the process, all of them took some form of risks, including 
those to their own safety. In 1903, brothers Orville and Wilbur Wright took their first 
successful human-controlled airplane to the air in that historic twelve-second flight and 
created a new chapter in human innovation. There is no doubt that the Wright brothers 
had tested various methods for their conceptual flight and preliminary designs before they 
could control the craft with three-axis control and the correct airfoil design. These 
pioneers of aviation who experimented with gliders and biplanes laid the groundwork for 
later generations to build more sophisticated advancements in aerodynamics and engine 
technology that will power them to new frontiers. 
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 Fast forward a hundred years later, human ingenuity and breakthroughs in 
machinery have enabled mankind to travel to space and control the air from the ground a 
thousand miles away. The risks and safety involved in experimenting with new 
technology have always been a challenge to those who flight tested them; those who tried 
to experiment with aerial control will often find themselves confronted with failures that 
may result in putting their lives in harm’s way. Despite the risks associated with flight 
tests, many organizations and government centers continue to set improvement targets 
with different purposes to control the sky using various methods including the newest 
marvel of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). 
1.1  USAF Flight Test Process 
 Different sources and organizations reference their UAVs in different ways. The 
nomenclature for an unmanned aerial vehicle is not standard across the industry; some 
have termed these vehicles as remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), or remotely operated 
aircraft (ROA), or unmanned aerial systems (UAS). For the purpose of this paper, the 
term unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) will be used to indicate any aircraft capable of 
flight without a human operator on board. Small UAVs (SUAV) specify vehicles that are 
measured a few feet across in length and wingspan, and these are typically found in 
surveillance, urban terrain operation, communications relay, and reconnaissance.  
Recent development and the ease of access to global positioning systems (GPS) 
and remote controlled instruments have led to an increase in SUAV research and 
development (R&D) in the United States (U.S.) and the world in general. It is now 
possible for a radio-controlled aircraft builder to manufacture SUAVs based on user 
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requirements and needs. The acceptable low risk and low cost in SUAV systems to 
operate in the battlefield have gained the attention of the military, causing it to engage in 
more R&D. Acceptable low risks and low costs are generally defined as the likelihood of 
an event whose probability of occurrence is subjected to an acceptable risk at a minimal 
loss but perceived as having greater benefits. The rapid pace of SUAV manufacturing 
processes has enabled many organizations and the military to conduct a different means 
of research that may prove critical to national defense and security by utilizing SUAVs to 
perform various missions, such as border patrol; intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR); and autonomous surveillance and patrol tasks on the battlefield. 
Presently, flight approval processes for SUAVs in the U.S. national airspace are 
mandatory in order to satisfy flight requirements as regulated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). Routinely, this process can sometimes take a few weeks to a few 
months (FAA, 2011). 
 There is an abundance of literature that describes the flight test approval process 
for larger and manned aircraft, including those from the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, FAA, 
and other national test ranges (Ward, 2006; Ingham, 2006; De Garmo, 2004). Similar to 
manned aircraft, the need to increase safety, reliability, and accountability on UAV 
performance necessitates flight test approval processes, as these SUAVs are becoming 
more autonomous. The purpose of a flight test approval process is to bring in multiple 
experts from different disciplines to strengthen the shared safety and technical 
responsibility between the approving authority and the operators. It is aimed at improving 
standards in aviation safety and technical feasibility of the vehicle. Normally, a flight test 
or ground test approval process accomplishes two main objectives: (1) finding and fixing 
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any identified aircraft design problems in the test plan and safety plan and (2) addressing, 
verifying, and documenting the flight test authority and the responsibility of the people 
involved in the process according to applicable standards and regulations (Ward et al., 
2006). These two main objectives bring the flight test process to a minimal level of 
acceptable risk, which is the lowest risk possible after all hazards have been eliminated or 
mitigated (Ward et al., 2006).  
1.2  Problem Statement 
 Currently, numerous safety requirements as well as lessons learned from previous 
tests have resulted in improved UAV design, engineering, and maintenance. Most flight 
test techniques and procedures for SUAVs are rather simple due to their designs and low 
cost and maintenance. However, regardless of how simple or complex these SUAVs can 
be, they are normally treated the same as manned aircraft when it comes to the flight test 
approval process in the USAF, and also by the FAA. There are also challenges created by 
flight mishaps that require additional time and resources to approve the “return to flight” 
of the mishap UAV. A return to flight approval is required once a vehicle is involved in a 
crash or mishap that results in property damage or injuries. The current UAV flight test 
approval process assumes the same resources and manpower are available that the 
majority of manned and larger aircraft projects have. Given the design and developmental 
scope of SUAVs and their lack of sophisticated hardware, it is hypothesized that the 
predominant flight test approval process for manned and larger aircraft may not be 
suitable for SUAVs.  
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 To improve the process for SUAV flight tests, a recommendation is needed to 
determine the overarching applicable standards and regulations for a SUAV flight 
approval process. This new recommendation should sufficiently increase the planning 
and development process for SUAVs that may be targeted for rapid product development 
for the warfighters, while adhering to safety and flight test regulations and risk 
management.  
1.3  Research Objectives 
In narrowing the scope of this study, the main objectives are to establish 
quantitative and qualitative measures of benefit for an abbreviated flight test process for 
SUAVs relative to its resource and schedule costs versus using the flight test process used 
primarily for manned and larger aircraft. In particular, the research will focus on the sizes 
and costs of the UAV as a way to determine the appropriate recommendation for a formal 
flight approval process. Additionally, this research will also determine whether or not 
SUAV flight tests should adhere to current standards and regulations based on their 
simplicity, cost, and urgency. Finally, this research will explore the benefits and risks 
involved when not using the current process as set out by the USAF.  
1.4  Assumptions and Limitations 
 Several significant assumptions were required for the comparison of the flight test 
approval process between SUAVs and larger manned aircraft to be feasible and practical. 
One primary assumption is the work value in resources and manpower added to each 
program will be different from each other; particularly, SUAV programs do not require as 
many resources and manpower as those of larger manned aircraft programs. Another 
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assumption is the system complexity and safety guidelines of both types of vehicles are 
assumed to be different due to the nature of manned versus unmanned aircraft (i.e., 
manned vehicles are more complex and require a higher standard of safety guidelines 
than unmanned SUAVs). Lastly, the risk assessment and management from both classes 
of vehicles are also assumed to be different, that is, SUAVs are sometimes expendable 
because of their low manufacturing and operating costs. 
 There are more than a few flight test processes nationwide (Ward et al., 2006), 
each with different approving authority and policies to make flight tests happen. Since 
this is exploratory research, this research will use the flight test process being utilized at 
Edwards Air Force Base (AFB) to make assessments and recommendations on the flight 
test approval process and its implications associated with SUAVs. It is recommended that 
future follow-on research should seek to validate and generalize this approach and 
methodology. 
1.5  Thesis Overview 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review, will examine the background in flight test approval 
process and its implementation, as well as the literature on the current flight test process 
and issues with traditional flight test methods for SUAVs. Chapter 3: Methodology, will 
discuss the methodology in collecting data and how each step in the process will be 
analyzed, as well as the scope of the projects involved. Chapter 4: Results and Analysis, 
provides analysis and results of this research. And finally, Chapter 5: Discussions and 
Conclusions, will summarize this research and present findings and recommendations for 
the flight testing SUAVs, along with recommendations for future research. 
 7 
II.  Literature Review 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the current literature on the small 
unmanned aerial vehicle (SUAV) flight test approval processes. This chapter starts with 
the history of flight test requirements and reviews the Memorandum of Agreement 
(MOA) between the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and the Air Force Flight 
Test Center (AFFTC) covering flight operations oversight of AFRL flight test programs 
and the authority and responsibilities from both organizations. The importance of flight 
tests will be discussed with factors affecting flight test methods. A short overview of the 
large potential military market for SUAVs will be presented. Lastly, a brief description of 
various popular known flight certification processes, including those from the FAA and 
other international agencies, will be discussed.  
2.1  MOA between AFRL and AFFTC 
 Before AFFTC involvement in AFRL’s flight test process, AFRL had been 
conducting a series of manned and unmanned flight tests ranging in various sizes from 
desk-sized UAVs to larger manned cargo aircraft. However, after a series mishaps and 
accidents (AFRL T&E Office, 2011), the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) directed 
that a rated Operations Group Commander provide oversight for all flying activities 
involving military, government civilian, or contractor flight operations (AFMC/A3, 
2006). By AFMC direction, the 412th Operations Group (OG) was identified as the Flight 
Operation Authority (FOA) for all AFRL flight test programs, except for the AFRL 
Munitions Directorate (AFRL/RW) for which the 46th OG (Eglin AFB) provides this 
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oversight. Edwards AFB is the home of AFFTC, including the 412th OG, and is one of 
the major flight test centers in the U.S. with the expertise to support and provide guidance 
to program managers (PM) at AFRL before approving any flight operations. The 
requirement for the 412th OG involvement in AFRL Test and Evaluation (T&E) is 
formalized in the MOA that was established in May of 2006 (2006-06-06MA). The MOA 
states: 
 
“The AFFTC has responsibility for the safe and effective conduct of flight 
operations for AFRL research programs requiring flight activities. The 
AFMC/A3 defers OPCON to the 412th Operations Group Commander 
(OG/CC) for AFRL research programs involving military, government 
civilian or contractor flight operations. To avoid duplicate reviews, 
inspections or evaluations, an integrated team approach for conducting 
program flight operation oversight will be used.” 
 
 
Deferring operational control (OPCON) to AFFTC for all AFRL flight operations 
includes a variety of programs ranging from small remote controlled (RC) aircraft, such 
as micro sensor test-beds, to full-scaled aircraft with advanced composite structures. The 
intent of the MOA is to have experienced flight testers review AFRL programs by 
providing insight and involvement on flight test programs by test pilots and flight test 
engineers. The personnel who review AFRL test plans are usually those who have 
experience with flight operations and also those who have graduated from the USAF Test 
Pilot School, which is also at Edwards AFB.  
There are certain requirements and procedures that AFRL and AFFTC must 
collaborate together on to have a flight test program approved for flight status. These 
responsibilities include AFRL providing monthly summaries for flight activities and 
notes, as well as UAV airworthiness from their safety review boards (SRB). Furthermore, 
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AFRL conducts technical review boards (TRB) and SRB in addition to documenting all 
flight authorizations from AFRL and AFFTC. AFFTC responsibilities include reviewing 
and approving test plans and safety plans in accordance with Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FAR), Air Force Instructions (AFI), and AFMC and AFFTC supplements. 
In the case of a flight mishap, AFFTC may provide assistance to the return to flight board 
and assist in technical and safety reviews (AFMC/A3, 2006). More information on the 
MOA between AFRL and AFFTC can be found in Appendix A. 
Normally, a flight test process begins at the AFRL T&E Office, as shown in 
Figure 2.1. The AFRL T&E Office accepts a flight test program from one of its 
directorates and begins coordinating within AFRL. Following AFRL SRBs and TRBs, 
the test package is submitted to the 412th OG for review. In almost all cases, the 412th OG 
provides comments and questions concerning flight safety and operational 
responsibilities and policies back to AFRL T&E Office for action. The review package 
can include a test plan, safety plan, crew qualifications, results from AFRL SBR, and 
flight authorizations. Comments and review procedures are usually handled over the 
phone or through email due to the two geographically separated locations. This overall 
process may take from three to six weeks for coordination to complete. Flight programs 
that are assessed as medium to high risks may take longer due to higher safety and 
technical requirements addressed by FAR, AFI, and AFFTC regulations.  
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Figure 2.1: AFRL and AFFTC Flight Test Approval Process 
(445th Flight Test Squadron, 2008) 
 
 
In addition to safety reviews from both AFRL and AFFTC, the PM is required to 
submit a vehicle airworthiness application for flight operations in accordance with AFI 
62-6 if the vehicle is to be flown outside restricted airspace. The airworthiness 
determination is independent from the PM’s chain of execution. The Technical 
Airworthiness Authority (TAA) is the authority to make these determinations for safe 
flight operations and approve all certification basis documents and issue Military Type 
Certificates (MTC) that prove the aircraft system type is in full compliance with the FAR. 
 
2.1.1  Risk Assessment and Test Approval Authority 
 As determined by the MOA presented earlier, the Test Approving Authority 
(TAA) from AFRL approves AFRL flight test programs while AFFTC approves the 
AFRL programs through the FOA. The AFI and Air Force Flight Test Center Instructions 
(AFFTCI) for flight tests mandate a higher authority review and approval for any 
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increase in risks. Per AFFTCI 91-5 and AFI 99-103, the signature authorities for low, 
medium, and high risk test plans are detailed in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1: AFFTC Signature Authority 
 (AFFTCI 91-5 AFFTC Test Safety Review Process) 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
LEVEL 
LOW RISK MEDIUM 
RISK 
HIGH RISK 
Operations Group 
Commander (OG/CC) 
or equivalent 
Approve Coordinate Coordinate 
Test Wing Commander 
(TW/CC) or equivalent 
Information Approve Coordinate 
AFFTC Commander 
(AFFTC/CC) 
Information Information Approve 
 
Low risk test plans are approved by the 412th OG Commander (412 OG/CC) and 
the owning AFRL Division Chief or their deputies before the start of any flight 
operations. Medium risk test plans are jointly approved by the 412th Test Wing 
Commander (412 TW/CC) and the owning AFRL Technical Directorate Director. High 
risk test plans are jointly approved by the AFFTC Commander (AFFTC/CC) and the 
AFRL Commander (AFRL/CC). All coordination comments between AFFTC and AFRL 
must be resolved before a final approval for test execution. To avoid any duplicate 
reviews, inspections, or evaluations by both organizations, an integrated test team 
approach is used for conducting flight operations oversight. 
 
2.1.2  Performance Gaps  
 Although instructions were provided by the AFRL T&E Office PMs on 
procedural methods to conduct flight tests and flight approval process, most of the test 
plans and safety plans are deemed inadequate by the AFRL T&E Office, which can be 
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traced to the lack of flight test experience and details in the preparation of test plans. 
Additional problems are caused because the majority of the PMs never sent initial 
notifications of pending tests to the AFRL T&E office. In 2010, over 40 test plans were 
submitted from different directorates to the AFRL T&E office, 90% of which were 
deemed low risk status, but over 50% of the test plans submitted for coordination were 
only given a three-week notice in a process that normally requires six months of lead 
time (AFRL T&E Office, 2011).  
 Previous research efforts conducted by Homan, Parker, Wirthlin, and Pignatiello 
(2011) found that the number of test plans submitted to AFFTC creates a potential major 
work bottleneck at the FOA at Edwards AFB, who is also responsible for nine other local 
test organizations. Moreover, these local flight tests are the FOA’s main duties at 
Edwards AFB, and they do usually take precedence over approving AFRL flight test 
programs. Another major problem is the workload and how it flows through the AFRL 
approval process, thus further delaying the flow of the test plans. As seen in Figure 2.2, 
members at the AFRL T&E Office handle numerous test plans per year submitted from 
dozens of PMs from different AFRL directorates. These test plans are sometimes written 
in non-standardized formats and are usually submitted late. This tardiness in most of the 
test plans delays the AFRL T&E Office reviewing the test plans and hampers 
coordinating with the members at AFFTC.  
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Figure 2.2: AFRL and AFFTC Flight Approval Performance Analysis 
(Modified from Homan et al., 2011) 
 
 In the case of a mishap, the return-to-flight process also uses the same test 
approval process and is usually handled by the same members approving the original test 
plans. Upon learning of a mishap, the AFRL T&E Office and the test team are required to 
notify AFFTC of the mishap. To mitigate further risks, the test team is required to stop all 
tests and file a report on the mishap, which takes more time and effort away from any 
other on-going coordination with the AFRL T&E Office and AFFTC. The reporting 
process begins when the mishap investigation is initiated by an integrated test team from 
both AFRL and the test team. AFRL holds all accountability and investigation 
responsibilities during the mishap. The 412th OG is the ground and return-to-fly approval 
authority for mishaps that are considered Class A or Class B, which include permanent, 
partial or total disability or property damage of $500,000 or more (AFMC/A3, 2006, 
AFRLM 99-103).  
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2.1.3  Improvement Initiatives  
 The performance gaps and issues presented earlier reveal a need for change in the 
process, manpower, and resources for management and improvement. Collectively, there 
is room for improvement on both sides of the process. Any new PM to the AFRL flight 
test process would notice the work burden carried by the AFRL T&E Office; yet, there is 
still another side to the issue, which is the work of approval authority at AFFTC. The 
FOA at AFFTC is often times regarded as the single chokepoint and sometimes blamed 
for the failure to deliver on-time approval of flight dates (Homan et al., 2011). Although 
AFFTC’s main concern for AFRL flight test programs is the safe conduct of flight tests 
in accordance with applicable AFFTC, FAA, and USAF instructions and their 
supplements, their main duty lies with nine other local flight test organizations or 
squadrons (Homan et al., 2011). Therefore, any quick reviews from AFFTC may 
jeopardize the safety of the program.   
Many discussions for improvements and exchange initiatives have been raised by 
both sides to speed up the process, but few have come to full fruition (AFRL T&E Office, 
2011). One of the initiatives that started from both sides of the process was an agreement 
to draft an amendment to the original MOA to eliminate AFFTC oversight on low risk 
programs and allow AFRL the authority to approve its own flight test programs without 
full AFFTC involvement (AFMC/A3, 2006). This initiative was funneled up to 
AFMC/A3 asking for AFRL to assume full approval authority and responsibility for all 
low risk programs, with the 412th OG continuing to provide oversight for medium and 
high risk programs as defined in the MOA. However, the initiative was quickly rejected 
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at AFMC/A3 after weighing the risks and benefits of having no Operations Group 
Commander oversight of an AFRL flight test program (HQ AFMC/A3F). 
2.2  The Importance of Flight Tests 
 Flight testing in both piloted and unmanned aerospace vehicles is an ongoing 
activity that pushes the limits of aeronautical and aerospace knowledge. The primary 
purpose of flight testing, according to the AGARD Flight Test Manual (Perkins et al., 
1959), lists three fundamental reasons for flight testing:  
 
1. To determine the actual characteristics of the machine. 
2. To provide developmental information. 
3. To obtain research information. 
 
 
Although the reasons listed above do not specifically indicate that modern 
aerospace vehicles require teams of engineers and scientists, whether piloted or 
unmanned; they do, however, provide the classical reasons for conducing flight tests. 
From this perspective, the true purpose of flight testing is to reduce future uncertainties in 
the design and test processes before going to the operational stages and airworthiness 
certifications. Flight testing also provides practical experiences to the operators and 
involves interaction with other systems that increases interoperability (Williams & 
Harris, 2002).  
Recent advances in technologies and new procedures may have been successfully 
integrated into the stages of aerospace development, but basic flight tests are required to 
provide credibility, and these must be proven in the flight test environment including 
piloted aircraft and UAVs. Additionally, the involvement of humans in UAV missions in 
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flight tests ensures that the total UAV system functions correctly. Flight tests and 
evaluations must also determine the suitability of the UAV system for use by the end 
users, especially the operators and maintainers (Williams & Harris, 2002).  
Historically, military systems have relied heavily on prototypes of airplanes to 
provide valuable predictions for development efforts. Since the early 1970s, the YF-22 
and YF-23, the YF-16 and YF-17, the YA-9 and YA-10, and the X-32 and X-35 efforts 
were all head-to-head flight test comparisons of competing prototypes (Ward et al., 
2006). Prototyping does not always lead to production, but may instead lead to further 
development of an existing design. Subsystems technology must also be proven in the 
harsh flight environment (Ward et al., 2006). These subsystems include radar, 
navigational systems, flight management systems, integrated displays, flight control 
system, communication systems, etc.  
According to the UAV Task Force Final Report (2004), unlike manned aircraft 
which are integrated by a network communication with air traffic control (ATC), flight 
management, and flight operation from various flight control operators, UAVs are 
dependent on a network of remote systems and subsystems to make flight operations 
possible. It is for this reason that testing and evaluation needs to be executed on the entire 
system of the UAV and not on the vehicle alone. This could raise the magnitude of 
testing a relatively uncomplicated SUAV to that of testing a highly complex integrated 
system (Williams & Harris, 2002).  
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2.3  Factors in Flight Testing 
 It takes thousands of man-hours and resources to build a new aircraft, but to get 
certification to be airworthy for flights, every part of an aircraft has to meet standards set 
out by the military and certifications required from the FAA. Testing a flight vehicle is a 
complex process. It requires careful planning and measures of completeness and accuracy 
in the data to be safe, within budget, and on time. In any form of tests, the most 
significant cost for any program is the cost of safety. Therefore, almost all policies or 
redundancies address safety concerns throughout the planning and conduct of any series 
of flight tests. Ward, et al. (2006) discus the three primary factors in the test planning 
process as the dominant concerns for all PMs and testers alike. 
 
2.3.1  Safety 
 Every test carries some element of risk, whether it is a low, medium, or high risk 
of a new prototype or determining the performance of a new piece of software on an 
aircraft system. Risk elimination is a responsibility carried by all who are involved in 
flight testing. Almost all flight test centers endorse a checklist approach toward safety 
concerns based on the culmination of past experience and what seems to be the best 
methodology in risk management. There is no single way to manage risk in engineering 
processes; however, many flight test organizations (both government and industry) use a 
standard set of procedures common to flight tests to manage risks. The following 
summary is based on the AFFTC and NASA Procedures and Guidelines on T&E control 
and conduct of risk assessment and risk mitigation (Ward et al., 2006). Most of the risk 
management process includes the following steps:  
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1. Hazard definition 
2. Cause identification / Risk assessment 
3. Risk mitigation 
4. Emergency response 
 
 
Test specific hazards are those that arise as a direct consequence of the test 
activity. This step explores some of the “what if” questions that might increase the 
probability of the hazard event occurring (Ward et al., 2006). Cause identification lists 
the likelihood of occurrence ranging from improbable to frequent that the cause should 
occur at least once. The severity of consequence of the cause ranges from negligible to 
catastrophic, which includes injury and death. Table 2.2 shows an example of a matrix of 
the hazard probability and its severity category. 
 
Table 2.2: Example Risk Assessment Matrix 
(AFFTCI 91-5 AFFTC Test Safety Review Process) 
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Risk mitigation is the process by which risks are reduced, moving them down and 
to the right in the risk assessment matrix (Ward et al., 2006). According to Ward et al. 
(2006), reduction in the severity level usually requires specific hardware mitigations, 
which are modifications to hardware to enhance the test safety; other reductions in the 
severity level are procedural mitigations, which are intended to decrease the risk and the 
likelihood of occurrence. Finally, every hazard analysis should include a procedural 
response or corrective actions and some planning to address a mishap should it occur.  
 
2.3.2  Cost 
 The cost of flight testing can range from tens of thousands to millions of dollars 
depending on the scale and scope of each test. It is therefore up to the engineers and PMs 
to consider the cost of each test to be conducted and analyzed whether the test is 
manageable, and most importantly, why the test should be done. While this research does 
not specifically focus on the factors of cost and the efficiencies of cost control and 
visibility, it does, however, weigh the cost benefit and risk of not having SUAVs go 
through the formal flight test approval process that larger manned aircraft do in the 
USAF. 
Support for flight tests should be kept as simple as possible and consistent with 
the risk and complexity of the test. Sometimes, flight test support can be as simple as a 
flight mechanic on the ground servicing the aircraft and as complex as linked telemetry 
and continuous radio communication with all aircraft (Ward et al., 2006). Ignoring the 
technical expertise on instrumentation can lead to incorrect data and retest, which would 
add more cost to future tests. Finally, every second spent in the air must be used 
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productively. PMs should keep a focus on combining series of tests together as often as 
possible to reduce fuel costs. Productive flying time should be used wisely but also 
provide sufficient time to check for adequate data collection and test parameters (Ward et 
al., 2006).  
Costs may increase if advanced instrumentation is involved. A SUAV may have 
low manufacturing cost and is replaceable if damaged, but the sensor payload attached to 
the SUAV may cost even greater than the SUAV itself. This huge gap in the costs 
between the carrier and the payload is one of the challenges in the flight test community, 
and SUAV regulators have yet to define a definite risk analysis to the payload should the 
UAV experience a flight mishap. 
 
2.3.3  Schedule 
Time is money. Naturally, nearly all flight test programs have time and costs 
among their prime targets or objectives. One of the biggest challenges PMs must face is 
meeting the scheduled deadline. Flight certification and approvals usually take a while to 
get approved (DoD OSD, 2009), so it is wise to plan ahead and schedule many months in 
advance before any actual test is being done. A schedule slip can force an entire program 
to be up for review or face cancellation. When time and costs are measured, performance 
may be lost due to constraints in the cost and schedule. However, for other projects such 
as life critical systems, quality in the performance would be the overriding criteria for 
determining the value of the project (Ward et al., 2006). A major factor in meeting the 
test schedule is how many test vehicles are allocated to the flight test program. Increasing 
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the number of flights or the number of test vehicles may alleviate a schedule problem, but 
it may not be the answer when costs are at a limit.  
2.4  The Military Market 
Recently, a market study released by Teal Group Corporation, an aerospace and 
defense market analysis company, estimates that UAV spending will almost double over 
the next decade from current worldwide UAV expenditures of $5.9 billion annually to 
$12 billion, of which the U.S. will account for 77% of the worldwide R&D and T&E 
spending on technology and about 69% on procurement (Teal Group Coorporation, 
2009). Figure 2.3 shows that the U.S. will dwarf the rest of the world in UAV R&D 
technology and procurement in the years ahead, followed by European and Asian-Pacific 
countries.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Worldwide UAV Forecast 
(Teal Group Corporation, COTS Journal Online, 2011) 
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Today, over 30 countries are investing and developing sophisticated UAVs for 
multiple purposes, including border patrol, global navigation, agricultural spraying, and 
planting operations (De Garmo, 2004). The most significant part of the U.S. R&D and 
procurement spending will be for the interests of the U.S. military. According to the 
Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD), since the 1950s, the U.S. 
military has spent more than $25 billion on UAV development. However, it has had 
difficulty in setting priorities, determining missions, and developing UAV standards, 
which has led to a number of programs being repeatedly modified, replaced, or cancelled 
(De Garmo, 2004). Despite the difficulty in setting UAV standards, the U.S. DoD is 
committed to setting the pace for UAV funding, research, and applications. In the last ten 
years alone, the U.S. military has increased over ten-fold the annual funding for UAVs, 
as shown in Figure 2.4. This figure is expected to keep rising, eclipsing robotic systems 
among the DoD’s top procurement priorities (Sully, 2004).  
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Figure 2.4: DoD Annual Funding Profiles for UAVs 
(De Garmo, 2004) 
2.5  Regulatory Requirements for SUAVs 
With a handheld GPS and a keen interest in aerodynamics, hobbyists and infantry 
alike are becoming attracted to SUAVs. SUAVs, normally powered by small electric or 
gas turbine engines, are often considered a subclass of UAVs. These SUAVs are 
becoming increasingly popular due to their sizes and simplicity in data fielding and 
operation. Traditionally, UAVs are primarily used by the military, but demands for UAV 
use have expanded to commercial and other governmental uses, which drives a 
considerable need for UAV flight regulations and operational requirements. However, 
because of the lack of airspace regulations and airworthiness and safety requirements, 
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access to UAV applications still present a major barrier and challenges to other markets 
other than the military (De Garmo, 2004).  
An airworthiness certificate is an FAA document which grants authorization to 
operate an aircraft in flight in compliance with the approved certification basis (FAA 
Website, 2011). According to AFI 62-601, airworthiness is defined as the “verified and 
documented capability of air system configuration to safely attain, sustain, and terminate 
flight in accordance with approved usage and limits.” A generic airworthiness defines 
whether an aircraft has been certified as suitable for safe flight without significant hazard 
to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (if relevant), or to the general public over which such 
airborne systems are flown.  
 
2.5.1  Issues with Traditional Flight Test Methods for SUAVs 
Not all R&D technology and procurement come without risks and mishaps. 
According to the DoD’s Airspace Integration Plan for Unmanned Aviation (2004), 
SUAVs have higher reported loss rates than manned aircraft, especially during takeoff 
and landing. Because of the nature of UAVs being unmanned, their loss could sometimes 
be regarded as acceptable in exchange for continuous data gathering and research efforts.  
Due to the nature of UAVs and their systems, safety aspects have yet to be 
defined and this leads to issues not normally considered for manned systems (EASA, 
2004). According to Ostler (2006), traditional flight testing methods may not be suitable 
for SUAVs for a number of reasons. First, in-flight engine power cannot be determined 
by measuring fuel flow (i.e., electric engines). Second, SUAVs that are electrically 
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powered do not decrease in weight over time as do conventional aircraft. Finally, data 
acquisition systems in SUAVs are limited in size and weight. 
Another area usually not considered in traditional flight test methods and the T&E 
of SUAVs is wind tunnel testing and aerodynamic analysis support. Although wind 
tunnel testing can provide data to predict and develop control surface designs, few SUAV 
operators opt to utilize wind tunnel testing, as it is generally accepted that flight testing 
out in the flight range is adequate enough and remains the most reliable method for 
SUAVs (Williams & Harris, 2002). In addition to SUAV hardware and autonomous 
system reliability, other flight test challenges include categorical flying qualities, flight 
performance, and avionics evaluations. Provisions for these SUAV flight tests may not 
completely follow conventional manned aircraft flight test techniques due to the nature of 
UAV flight cues and their sensitivities due to of their small physical sizes and weights 
(Williams & Harris, 2002).  
Another area of concern is the required region of airspace possessing the 
appropriate vertical and lateral limits to conduct flight testing of UAV systems (Williams 
& Harris, 2002). This region of airspace should have few obstructions, such as power-
lines, tall structures, and trees, and it should be located outside civil controlled airspace. 
Some SUAVs are now able to execute tasks autonomously, such as takeoff and landing. 
Unfortunately, the lack of UAV regulations has prevented these SUAVs from operating 
in unrestricted airspace alongside manned aircraft (Ingham et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
this restriction has more complications due to an unproven technical safety record where 
the data cannot be collected until more UAVs can operate alongside manned aircraft, 
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which results in a “chicken and egg” situation (Ingham, 2006; Kuke, 2004; De Garmo, 
2004).  
 
2.5.2  UAV Standards and Regulations in the National Air Space 
Standards and regulations are part of the flight test process and requirements for 
airworthiness. By definition, a standard is an accepted minimum requirement in which 
compliance must be shown to achieve certification or qualification status (Ingham, 2008). 
UAV standards are currently under development from the FAA for airworthiness 
certifications. A regulation, such as the FAR, is a set of legislative prescriptions that must 
be complied with prior to, as well as during, the operation of a UAV in the national 
airspace (Ingham, 2008). Such regulations are also under development for civil UAV 
flights in commercial airspace.  
Although UAV markets for military and civil applications have been steadily 
growing, the lack of regulatory framework in creating standards and regulations has been 
evident. With new UAV technology, major flight test organizations including the FAA 
must first determine the risks of any associated system failures before the new technology 
is considered safe to be put into the National Airspace Systems (NAS) (Ingham, 2008). 
Any unforeseen developments, technological improvements, and human factors play a 
role in whether the new technology is safe enough to be permitted into the NAS. Once 
the risks are addressed, flight safety and integration into the NAS are taken in stages, 
similar to the developmental testing and operational testing and evaluation (DT&E, 
OT&E) established by the DoD. The FAA is also using the same DT&E and OT&E 
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methodology to manage the integration of the UAV technology into the NAS (Kalinowki, 
2010).  
Current recreational use of the NAS limits UAV operations to below 400 feet 
above ground level and away from airports and air traffic (FAA Website, 2011). The 
FAA’s main concern is not only that UAVs might interfere with commercial and general 
aviation operations, but that they could also pose a safety problem for other airborne 
vehicles and persons or property on the ground. Developing and implementing new UAV 
standards and regulations is a long-term effort for the FAA, especially when there is little 
data available to integrate UAVs safely and efficiently into the NAS. The FAA also 
indicates that more safety data is needed before it can establish a decision to fully 
integrate UAVs into the NAS, where the general aviation public travels each day (FAA 
Factsheet, 2011).  
2.6  Possible Airworthiness and Certification 
The objective of UAV certification in an unrestricted airspace is to achieve “file 
and fly” operations, but in order to achieve flight operations, flight tests will have to be 
executed in order to prove compliance with relevant regulations and prove its 
airworthiness (Ingham, 2008). Flight testing for airworthiness in SUAVs is sometimes 
conducted to observe the usefulness of the latest developments for conventional aircraft. 
For example, a new control law or a novel wing structure was tested using SUAVs in 
aerial flight (Brinker, 2001; Murray, 2002). One of the major challenges in operating an 
SUAV is the capability to detect and avoid aircraft and other objects while airborne. 
Collision avoidance has become the most pressing concern, and is also the focus for 
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many studies and research institutions worldwide, including AFRL with its Auto 
Avoidance Collision System (De Garmo, 2004).  
To avoid collisions with other aircraft, UAVs must have a “sense and avoid” 
capability, which allows them to detect and safely stay clear of other aircraft and 
obstructions midair (De Garmo, 2004). This development of “sense and avoid” capability 
in UAVs has also provided significant benefits for both manned and unmanned operators 
(Ingham et al., 2006). While UAV proponents view this new technology as promising, 
the limited safety and operational data available does not support the full integration of 
UAVs into the NAS (FAA Website, 2011).   
 
2.6.1  Current Initiatives 
All UAVs and manned aircraft in the NAS are regulated by the FAA under 
jurisdiction granted by law (FAA, 2011). While it is unarguable that large and heavy 
UAV airframes require an airworthiness certification, the question yet remains for 
SUAVs that have wingspans measuring less than a few feet across and weighing less than 
a hundred pounds. Do these SUAVs need the same airworthiness certification as those of 
larger sized UAVs? Some UAV enthusiasts argue that if such regulations are mandated 
on SUAVs to meet the same requirements for airworthiness certification, it would 
negatively affect airframe vendors and the SUAV manufacturing industry (UAV 
MarketSpace). A recent safety study for UAV operation in the NAS from MIT’s 
International Center for Air Transportation (ICAT) (2005) concludes that “the results of 
the safety analysis indicate that it may be possible to operate small UAVs with few 
operational and size restrictions over the majority of the United States.”  
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In response to the influx of SUAV airworthiness applications, the FAA has 
developed a memorandum titled “Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations in the U.S. 
National Airspace System – Interim Operational Approval Guidance” for guidance of 
UAVs in the NAS. The FAA is also moving forward with UAV regulations and 
guidelines to minimize accidents and failures. Furthermore, the FAA is working with the 
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) to develop technical UAV 
standards. Mainly, RTCA will address two key questions on UAVs regarding their 
handling of communication, command, and control, and how UAVs will “sense and 
avoid” other aircraft. According to a statement by Kalinowski before the Committee on 
Homeland Security (2010), these activities are targeted for completion before 2015.  
Other countries are also publishing or have already published regulations for 
SUAVs. The French Ministry of Defense has drafted UAV regulations which are being 
used by other organizations as a guideline (Ingham, 2008). The Joint 
JAA/EUROCONTROL Initiative on UAVs final report (2004) proposes fairness, 
equivalence, accountability, and responsibility as guiding principles for integrating UAVs 
operating in civil airspace. The report emphasizes the use of existing manned regulations 
while recognizing the need to tailor and complement them when considering the specific 
characteristic of UAV operations.  
Other national and international agencies are also proposing standards to bring 
UAV flight operations within the manned operational environment in conjunction with 
the military and civil airspace. Some of these various government and industry initiatives 
include: The Technical Analysis and Applications Center (TAAC), Joint Planning and 
Development Office (JPDO) UAV National Task Force (UNTF), UAV National Industry 
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Team (UNITE), American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) UAV Committee, 
and many other agencies worldwide with the objective of developing and introducing 
UAVs regulations in national and international airspace (De Garmo, 2004). 
In response to the growth and development of SUAVs, most organizations have 
already accepted a short cut by adopting manned aircraft regulations that are suitable for 
UAV flight operations (Ingham, 2008; DoD OSD, 2004; Williams & Harris, 2002). 
Different agencies or flight test organizations have different regulatory bodies that govern 
their policies regarding SUAVs. Some agencies have proposed relaxed regulations 
accordingly for academic institutions, research organizations, and UAV developmental 
organizations that design and test UAVs provided that these UAVs do not pose a threat to 
people and property on the ground (Ingham et al., 2006). For example, light UAVs 
weighing less than 150 kg with a kinetic energy of less than 95 kJ might not be required 
to be certified, provided that they will operate as radio controlled aircraft within the 
operator’s visual range in unrestricted airspace for missions such as telemetry and aerial 
photography. However, larger UAVs weighing more than 150 kg with a kinetic energy of 
more than 95 kJ and light UAVs flying in unrestricted airspace or outside the visual range 
of the operator will be required to be flight tested and approved in a similar manner to 
that of manned aircraft (CASR 1998, 2001).  
Other approaches to airworthiness and certification of SUAVs include the 
adaptation of a “safety target” from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). 
Under this approach, the overall objective of the UAV is within the context of a defined 
mission and operating environment (EASA, 2004). The Safety Target approach is utilized 
when UAV operators are under the direct control of a single authority, which has 
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complete responsibility for safety, and is also the sole “customer.” EASA argues that 
“this direct control of operations is a significant advantage when accepting a safety case 
which relies upon the restriction of operations to compensate for uncertainties over 
airworthiness” (EASA, 2004).  
 
2.6.2  DoD Initiatives 
As more UAV flight tests are being conducted by the USAF, military standards 
have become restrictive regarding the safety and responsibility of the UAV programs, 
resulting in excessive costs in manpower and delays in schedule (Ingham et al., 2006). 
According to Ingham, et al. (2006), these same restrictions have often excluded suitable 
suppliers because of their non-compliance with such specifications, regardless of the 
rapid growth in the number of companies with high interests in the UAV business (Teal 
Group Corporation, 2011).  
In 1999, the DoD, working with the FAA, developed a flight approval process 
known as a Certificate of Authorization (COA) contained in FAA Order 7610.4, Military 
Operations, that permitted UAVs to operate in the National Airspace Systems (NAS) (De 
Garmo, 2004). According to the FAA Factsheet (2011), the FAA issues a COA based on 
the following principles: 
 
1. The COA authorizes an operator to use defined airspace and includes 
special provisions unique to each operation. For instance, a COA may 
include a requirement to operate only under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) 
and/or during daylight hours. Most COAs are issued for a specified time 
period (up to one year, in most cases). 
2. Most, if not all, COAs require coordination with an appropriate air traffic 
control facility and may require the UAS to have a transponder to operate 
in certain types of airspace. 
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3. Due to the UASs inability to comply with ”sense and avoid” rules, a 
ground observer or an accompanying “chase” aircraft must maintain 
visual contact with the UAS and serve as its “eyes” when operating 
outside of airspace that is restricted from other users. 
 
According to De Garmo (2004) and FAA regulations, this process requires a case-
by-case safety evaluation of each flight, which results in a lengthy process that can take 
up to three months to approve depending on the FAA region or regions where the UAV 
will be flown. Part of the approval process requires the FAA to issue a time and route of 
the UAV flight to avoid risks to other aircraft and persons in the area, which further 
limits the utility and missions of UAVs. The process is incapable of sustaining the high 
volume of UAV flight requests (De Garmo, 2004). The FAA recognizes that the 
processes is lengthy and has taken steps to streamline the process by standardizing the 
review process and increasing communication and transparency between the agency and 
the applicants (Kalinowski, 2010). Normally, COAs are worked on a first-come, first-
served basis, with the exception of emergency and disaster situations where the use of 
UAVs warrants humanitarian needs.  
2.7  Summary 
 This chapter detailed the importance of flight tests and the critical factors in flight 
testing. There is an abundance of literature on proposals for UAV regulations and safety 
standards, and this chapter briefly discussed the current initiatives carried out by the FAA 
and other agencies in promoting UAV technology in the common airspace. However, 
additional UAV data and flight requirements are needed to reach a decision for UAVs to 
fly in the commercial airspace. With an understanding of the complications of SUAV 
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flight test requirements and the background in the MOA between AFRL and AFFTC, it is 
clear that additional studies are necessary to evaluate the process and determine the 
benefits of additional safety reviews and the costs associated with it. The literature is 
silent on this subject and forms the basis of this research. 
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III.  Methodology 
 
This chapter reviews the methodology used in this research. The primary purpose 
of the methodology is to establish a quantitative and qualitative measure of benefit for an 
abbreviated flight test process for SUAVs based on the MOA between AFRL and 
AFFTC. This research’s methodology uses interviews, cost sensitivity analysis, and 
variability analysis using value stream mapping (VSM) techniques in the SUAV flight 
testing processes for the development of a notional decision rule matrix. This chapter also 
discusses the development of acceptable cost and optimal risk and the boundaries drawn 
from analysis to construct a decision rule. 
3.1  Research Design 
 This research is exploratory in nature using multidisciplinary approaches and 
techniques, both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative research describes phenomena 
in numbers and measures instead of words; the focus of the research is usually 
predetermined and deducted from prior research (Krathwohl, 1998). Qualitative research, 
on the other hand, describes phenomena in words instead of numbers or measures and 
usually uses induction to ascertain what is important in the phenomena (Krathwohl, 
1998).  
By leveraging these multidisciplinary techniques (qualitative cost-benefit 
analysis, interviews, cost sensitivity, variability analysis, and heuristic risk analysis), this 
research will evaluate and quantify the current process used in the AFFTC review process 
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and create a decision rule for future test flights. Figure 3.1 shows an outline of this 
research’s methodology, which will be discussed in detail. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Research Methodology Overview 
 
 
The use of these techniques, both quantitative and qualitative, offers a decision-
driven instead of hypothesis-driven methodology. A decision-driven methodology is 
intended to facilitate making a decision about the applicability or worth of the process in 
a given situation (Krathwohl, 1998). Such applicability to this situation may include the 
total cost of the SUAV, its total impact energy, and weight of the vehicle. This overall 
heuristic evaluation should offer the desired consensus or accepted basis for decision 
making. For example, if the cost of the SUAV is less than that of the total cost the test, 
then it may be necessary to reevaluate the total cost of the joint AFRL/AFFTC approval 
process. Adversely, if the cost of the UAV is greater than that of the total cost of the 
flight test process and execution, then the approval process is likely justified for greater 
accountability and safety reviews. This approach may prove to be useful when comparing 
the current UAV flight approval process to an abbreviated process.  
3.2  Qualitative Cost-Benefit Analysis 
A qualitative cost-benefit analysis is defined as the determination of the costs of 
achieving certain benefits (Krathwohl, 1998). Cost-benefit analysis methodologies have 
been used for multiple purposes in many different studies; its outcomes must be 
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translated into monetary or other measure of value so their relation to costs may be 
determined (Krathwohl, 1998). For a cost-benefit analysis conducted in this research, the 
benefit may be in the form of cost and time savings from an abbreviated flight test 
process. 
According to Krathwohl (1998), cost-benefit analyses are often greatly affected 
by the assumptions of difficult-to-estimate indirect costs and outcomes, such as the 
personnel costs of individuals with different levels of qualifications. By measuring 
outcomes across different programs according to the magnitude of their effects relative to 
their costs in comparable terms, cost-effectiveness analysis allows a comparison of 
choices of achieving certain benefits in relation to other methods of obtaining the same 
benefits (Krathwohl, 1998; Rossi & Freeman, 1985). 
 
3.2.1  Criteria Development and Assumptions for Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 In order to quantify the current process used by the USAF per the MOA between 
AFRL and AFFTC, a VSM of the flight test approval process is reused from a lean 
process improvement study conducted by Homan and colleagues (2011), as shown in 
Appendix B. To ensure this research quantifies the standard USAF flight test process and 
any abbreviated flight test process for SUAVs, a comprehensive holistic assumption was 
required for the comparison of both processes. It is assumed that all work has a value-
added and a non-valued-added component to it. First, any value-added (VA) work 
identified in resources and manpower is assumed to be valid—that an average hourly rate 
and time per person reviewing the flight test program was standard across all 
organizations. Second, any non-value-added (NVA) work time and resources consists of 
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waste and necessary waste, which include policy, regulations, and standard processing 
time. Non-value-added “pure waste” consists of the “cost of delays,” in which man-hours 
were considered “lost” due to queuing effects in the approval process and doing “no 
work” while waiting.  
Furthermore, other assumptions in the data gathering of this study include the 
value-added work in terms of resources and manpower for SUAV programs and those of 
larger manned aircraft are likely to be different from each other. It was assumed that 
SUAV programs do not require as much resources and manpower as those of larger 
manned aircraft programs. Another assumption is that system complexity and safety 
guidelines of both types of vehicles are assumed to be different due to the nature of 
manned versus unmanned aircraft (i.e., manned vehicles are more complex and require a 
higher standard of safety guidelines than SUAVs). Lastly, the risk assessment and 
management of both classes of vehicles are also assumed to be different—that SUAVs 
are sometimes expendable because of their low manufacturing and operating costs when 
compared to larger conventional aircraft.  
 
3.2.2  Notional Balance Statement 
By using the criteria for qualitative cost-benefit analysis and the comprehensive 
assumptions, a notional overall breakdown of the total cost of flight testing a SUAV is 
proposed in Table 3.1. The total cost of a SUAV flight test includes the costs of 
approving flight status from both organizations (AFRL and AFFTC) and the cost of test 
execution. 
 
 38 
Table 3.1: Notional SUAV Flight Test Balance Statement 
 
SUAV Program Asset Cost  
  
Test Execution Cost  
AFRL Review Cost  
     AFRL Risk Abatement Cost  
     Value Added Work  
     Non-value Added Work  
          Waste  
          Necessary Waste  
AFFTC Review Cost   
     AFFTC Risk Abatement Cost  
     Value Added Work  
     Non-value Added Work  
      Waste   
      Necessary Waste  
    
Total SUAV Asset and Liabilities  
 
This flight test approval process can be summarized in its most basic and simple 
balance statement equation based on the assumptions and criteria discussed earlier: 
 
TestTotal Cost = AFRLReview Cost + AFFTCReview Cost + TEcost, where, 
AFRLReview Cost = AFRLRAC + VA + NVA 
AFFTCReview Cost = AFFTCRAC + VA + NVA 
 
The Test Total Cost is the total cost of the test. The Review Costs at AFRL and AFFTC 
include the Risk Abatement Cost (RAC) and the value-added (VA) and non-value-added 
(NVA) costs. The Risk Abatement Cost (RAC) represents the safety and technical reviews 
performed by the approving authority at AFRL and AFFTC prior to test execution. The 
respective VA and NVA costs at AFRL and AFFTC are directly and indirectly incurred 
from both organizations as part of approving process per regulations and policy, based on 
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their respective resources and manpower. Next, TEcost is the cost of test execution, which 
is the operating cost to fly the SUAV. Finally, the SUAV Asset Cost consists of the 
vehicle platform cost and the payload cost. However, for cost simplicity, this research 
will not differentiate between these two costs but assumes they are a single asset cost. 
The basic notional balance statement sheet presented may be elementary, as it 
only shows a very generic cost to the total SUAV flight test operation. Additionally, 
when comparing the two balance statements, one with AFFTC risk abatement cost and 
the other without AFFTC risk abatement cost, the PM would choose the lesser of the two 
for cost and schedule savings. However, further analysis in risk assessment, data 
variability, and cost sensibility may call into question this simple approach. 
 
3.2.3  Interviews 
The qualitative cost-benefit analysis for this study will be coupled with insights 
from qualitative interviews in order to elicit the processing costs of an abbreviated 
process. It is assumed that the cost-benefit analysis requires personal interviews for data 
validation and strengthening the results. Interviews are one qualitative research 
methodology that allows the interviewer to gain a depth of responses from individuals in 
the process, yet it has its own disadvantages. Interview responses are often reflected by 
individual biases, and may also be in a form of confidentiality unbeknownst to the 
interviewer (Krathwohl, 1998). These responses may be difficult to analyze due to the 
sensitivity of the subject and the predisposition of individuals to respond a certain way. 
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3.2.4  Cost Sensitivity 
Cost sensitivity measures how variations in the overall [SUAV] configuration 
affect the resource requirements and costs (Tenzer, 1965). As discussed earlier, there are 
always some forms of uncertainties and risks involve in flight testing, especially to 
SUAVs when its total cost is sensitive to its payload. One way to measure cost sensitivity 
is the design and operational parameters of the SUAV. The total flight test costs may 
greatly increase if an advanced sensor payload is attached to the SUAV, which may also 
significantly increase the risk factor and the costs associated with the whole program. 
Another way to look at cost sensitivity is the question of necessity in redundant reviews 
for SUAVs. SUAV flight parameters and their associated costs may be the driving factor 
in adding the flight approval review times, as these reviews may cause delays to the 
programs. To an extent, any changes in the associated costs of the program are sensitive 
to the decision rule used. 
3.3  Data Variability Analysis 
In addition to the qualitative cost-benefit analysis, personal interviews, and cost 
sensitivity analysis, data variability obtained using the VSM will be analyzed. A VSM is 
one the first products created when attempting a process improvement as described by 
Womack and Jones (2003). McManus (2005) states that a VSM is a tool for achieving an 
efficient process, and that its sole purpose is for process improvement by evaluating the 
process holistically.  The goal of the VSM is to depict material and information flows 
across and throughout all the value-adding and non-value adding (waste) processes 
required to produce the product (i.e., approval status) and deliver it to the customer (i.e., 
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the program manager and test team) (McManus & Millard, 2003). Therefore, the VSM is 
an appropriate approach due to its “all-in-one” top-level picture of all the processes that 
occur in the flight approval process, from the time a test plan is submitted to the time it is 
approved for flight status. 
 In a perfect process, every link in the approval chain should be synchronized, 
making the approval system as lean as possible. However, achieving a high level of 
synchronization requires a “smooth flow” process (Murman, 2002). The current flight 
test approval process involves moderate to high variability in the value flow streams, as 
organizations have variable flight test demands at different times and resources to 
approve fight tests. According to Oehmen and Rebentisch (2010), variability in process 
execution leads to widely varying process times and thus a low degree of 
synchronization. Oehmen and Rebentisch (2010) also argue that over utilized capacities 
(e.g., engineers) can also be a cause for such variations, as these disturbances cannot be 
buffered and immediately lead to delays.  
One of the purposes of VSM is to identify and predict locations of process 
variability. If variability cannot be controlled due to budget or schedule constraints in the 
program, then there should be enough takt time in the individual process steps so the end 
step in the process will not have high variability. Takt time is the number of units of work 
demanded by the customer divided by the available time (McManus, 2005); for this 
research effort, it is the number of days needed for a completed test plan review to get 
approved for flight test. According to McManus (2005), the single most important 
concept of lean product development is achieving a takt time, and that all tasks or steps in 
the process must then proceed at this pace. 
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For example, if the FOA’s average rate for approving a test plan is three days, 
then the takt time at the FOA step is three even if the actual data varies with the 
workload. The FOA must be able to support this average takt time of three days per test 
plan review, or the overall demand for work cannot be met, which would trigger 
bottlenecks and delays in the downstream processes. In summary, in an uncontrolled 
process with variations of any sort, queuing effects will tend to build delays between 
process steps and pile up work at bottlenecks (McManus, 2005). 
3.4  Managing Acceptable Cost and Optimal Risk 
 Many in the T&E community know the risk hazards present in the 
operation of any complex system, manned and unmanned systems included. This concern 
is probably one of the major reasons why UAV standards and regulations are being 
worked throughout many organizations in the development of UAV safety and 
airworthiness certification. Based on data from the T&E community, especially those 
coming from the military, UAVs have a poor safety record (De Garmo, 2004). According 
to an April 2003 Congressional Research Service report, the UAV accident rate is 100 
times that of manned aircraft (Bone & Bolkcom, 2003). Another study conducted by the 
USAF in 2002 concluded that the accident rate for UAVs is 50 times greater than that of 
an F-16 fighter jet (De Garmo, 2004).  
A more recent 2009 DoD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap determined 
that UAVs have suffered mishaps at one to two orders of magnitude greater than the rate 
(per 100,000 hours) incurred by manned military aircraft. Figure 3.2 shows the mishap 
rates per 100,000 flight hours between manned and unmanned vehicles between 1986 to 
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2006. Notice that SUAVs such as the Hunter, Shadow, and Pioneer, whose wingspans 
and body lengths have an average from 10 feet to 20 feet, have higher mishap rates 
compared to those of other types of vehicles. Also noted is the decrease in mishaps as 
these SUAVs accumulate more flight hours. The decrease in SUAV mishaps shown in 
Figure 3.2 represents a steep learning curve from SUAVs as the technology matures. 
  
 
Figure 3.2: U.S. Military Aircraft and UAV Class A Mishap Rates 
(DoD FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, 2009) 
 
It is for this very reason of UAV mishap rates that PMs and UAV operators 
should carefully manage the cost of these SUAVs and reduce the risk to an optimal level 
necessary for the continuation of flight tests in the program. As clearly stated in the 
previous chapter (Chapter 2: Literature Review), the primary goal of any flight approval 
process for airworthiness and flight certification is to reduce risks and increase safety 
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standards among SUAVs and other airborne vehicles, including those who flight test 
them. While it has always been the PM’s goal to reduce the costs in UAV flight 
operations and any overhead costs incurred while waiting for the flight approval process, 
the cost of risk abatement in time and resources is almost always never explicitly 
managed. However, with limited resources and time, the question becomes, “How much 
risk abatement is enough as part of the flight test approval process?” Figure 3.3 shows a 
classical answer from economics where the optimal level of risk is where the sum of the 
cost of risk abatement and the expected losses from risk is at a minimum (Morgan, 1981).  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Managing Cost and Level of Risk 
(Morgan, 1981) 
 
Two of the most common forms of risks are “acceptable risk” and “optimal risk.” 
(Morgan, 1981). Acceptable risk implies a predetermined criterion or standard for a 
maximum risk threshold level below which risk will be tolerated, and thereby permits the 
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evaluation of cost, national priority interests, and number of tests to be conducted (U.S. 
Army White Sands Missile Range, Morgan). Optimal risk implies a trade-off that 
minimizes the sum of all undesirable consequences (Morgan, 1981). It is this optimality 
that justifies careful attention, thus the basis of this research in terms of an abbreviated 
approval process for SUAVs where redundancy in the cost of risk abatement may be 
unnecessary.  
One way to reduce the cost of risk abatement is to actually reduce its cost by 
shortening some of the safety review times. However, reducing the cost of risk abatement 
in this way would likely increase the level of risks and the expected losses from risk, 
resulting in an increase to the total cost of the program because of the accompanying 
reduction in scrutiny of the safety review. Therefore, the primary method used in this 
study is to determine the cost benefit of an abbreviated flight test to achieve an optimal 
level of risk. This optimal level of risk should demonstrate an appropriate reduction in the 
cost of risk abatement while maintaining or decreasing the expected losses from risk, thus 
minimizing the total costs incurred from the flight approval process and UAV operation. 
In investigating the notional optimal level of risk, this study proposes shifting the total 
cost curve and the cost of risk abatement curve to the left, as seen in Figure 3.4.  
If a reduction in the cost of risk abatement is attainable, either through eliminating 
AFFTC reviews or decreasing the complexity of the vehicle, the abbreviated approval 
process may reveal that it can be condensed and shortened with probable cost savings to 
the total cost and expected losses from risk. Various features in the flight test approval 
process can be factored in when deciding how much risk abatement, or for the purposes 
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of this research, the degree to which safety reviews are modulated in the process to save 
time and money.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Notional Optimal Level of Risk 
3.5  Summary 
 This chapter has detailed the methodology used in this study. The notional flight 
test balance sheet with proposed assumptions tailored by interviews and cost sensitivity 
analysis establish the conditions needed to create a better understanding of the costs 
associated with the flight test approval process. Furthermore, data variability analysis will 
be used to present a thorough overview of the current process depicted in the VSM and 
the issues that arise from it. Additionally, by combining the balance sheet and the 
analyses, this methodology seeks to expose the advantages and disadvantages of flight 
test process steps in the overall chain of reviews and approvals. Finally, this chapter 
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notionally identified the costs of risk abatement and the expected losses due to SUAV 
flight tests. The results and analysis using this methodology are presented in Chapter 4. 
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IV.  Results and Analysis 
 
This chapter describes the results and analysis of the data gathered from the flight 
test offices. The first section details the flight test balance statement with relevant 
assumptions in operational and personnel costs to determine the cost-benefit of the 
review process at AFFTC. The second section focuses on VSM analysis of cost 
sensitivity and time variability in the chain of approval process through a Variability 
Simulator. Next, the analysis on risk management with acceptable risk to costs and 
optimal risk in flight testing are shown. These cost benefits are then measured against the 
cost of risk abatement and expected losses to the UAV to determine the threshold where 
it makes sense that the review process at AFFTC adds value. 
4.1  Cost Measurement Analysis 
 Cost measurements are taken from labor hours and costs of operating and 
maintaining a SUAV. The intention of this analysis is to determine whether the extra 
reviewing and approval process at AFFTC is needed from the point of view of a 
simplistic SUAV flight test. These costs were taken from historical data and labor hours 
were assumed based on the rank and pay grade of the officer in charge of certain 
processes. Comparisons were made with significant assumptions due to the sensitivity of 
the SUAV costs and the difficult-to-estimate indirect costs. Nevertheless, the balance 
statement in the cost measurement analysis shows the financial resources available so that 
PMs may decide how to use cost information in the assessment of economic alternatives. 
It may sound elementary that the lower cost in the balance statement will most likely be 
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chosen, but it may be apparent that there are several other issues and problems that must 
be dealt with in order to develop further analysis for cost benefits.  
 
4.1.1  Estimated Cost Balance Statement 
 Historical data from 2011 shows 22 different SUAV tests within the continental 
United States, averaging $66,500 in costs per vehicle. Each program had an average of 
two SUAVs produced and flown during the life of the program, which can be added up to 
a total of $133,000 in SUAV program assets. Each SUAV also had an average of 23.8 
sorties and 9.9 flight hours (see Appendix C for SUAV costs and mishap data). The test 
execution cost, estimated at $30,000, was based off of the average range cost, fuel cost, 
and any extra burden and overhead costs including personnel involved in the flight test of 
the SUAV. The following processing days were taken from the current VSM flight test 
process (Appendix B) developed by Homan et al. (2011) and the AFRL T&E Office 
(Appendix C) to determine a conservative estimated cost of the review process. 
The AFRL technical and safety reviews (TRB & SRB) typically took four to five 
weeks (25 working days) prior to the actual test execution; therefore, it was possible to 
estimate the value-added (VA) time and costs of the review process. With a conservative 
assumption of a four-member team including those at the AFRL T&E Office working 25 
working days and one Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) or a GS-15 pay grade technical lead 
working two (2) days, the total TRB and SRB cost averaged $20,000. Since AFFTC does 
not normally take part in the TRB and SBR at AFRL for low risk test plans, this value 
was low; but nevertheless, an estimate of one (1) working day was added for any 
comments provided from the FOA to the AFRL TRB and SRB. 
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Next, the non-value added (NVA) work (waste and necessary waste) both at 
AFRL and AFFTC were greatly assumed as standard processing time with delays. These 
delays can sometimes be considered as buffer times or variations against uncertainties in 
the overall process. The assumption on AFRL waste and necessary waste was one (1) and 
two (2) working days, respectively. AFFTC’s non-value added waste work was assumed 
to be two (2) working days.  
Finally, the AFRL risk abatement cost (AFRLRAC) was also based on an average 
O-5 or a GS-15 pay grade combined with the current five (5) working days to approve a 
flight test at AFRL per the VSM. Likewise with AFFTC risk abatement cost 
(AFFTCRAC), except the current average processing time to approve an AFRL flight test 
at AFFTC was six (6) working days, which was based off of the data provided by the 
AFRL T&E Office. When combining all of this data together, the total average SUAV 
asset and liability has a total cost of $191,500.  
Table 4.1 summarizes the value-added (VA) time required at critical steps through 
the flight approval process. The first step requires the PM to meet with the AFRL T&E 
Office to conduct TRB and SRB and document mishap reporting procedures in the test 
plan—all of which happen four to five weeks prior to test execution. The second step 
requires the AFRL Technical Director Division Chief’s (GS-15) review and approval to 
start test, which normally takes five (5) working days. The third step, which is in 
conjunction with the second step, requires the FOA at AFFTC to review and approve the 
test plan in order to start the flight test, which averages six (6) working days. Table 4.2 
shows the balance statement of an average typical SUAV flight test. 
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Table 4.1: Estimated Time for AFRL/AFFTC Approval Review 
 
Process Step AFRL Processing 
Time (Work days) 
AFFTC Processing 
Time (Work days) 
PM meets with AFRL 
T&E Office to conduct 
TRB & SRB and 
finalizes test plan 
 
4 members take 25 WD 
1 O-5/GS-15 take 2 WD 
 
1 O-5/GS-15 take 1 WD 
Get AFRL Division 
Chief (GS-15) to review 
and approve to start test 
 
1 O-5/GS-15 take 5 WD 
 
 
n/a 
Get AFFTC FOA (O-5) 
to review and approve to 
start test 
 
n/a 
 
1 O-5/GS-15 take 6 WD 
 
Table 4.2: Notional SUAV Cost Balance Statement 
 
SUAV Program Asset Cost $133,000 
  
Test Execution Cost $30,000 
AFRL Review Cost  
     AFRL Risk Abatement Cost $2,100 
     Value Added Work $20,000 
     Non-value Added Work  
          Waste $1,200 
          Necessary Waste $1,500 
AFFTC Review Cost   
     AFRL Risk Abatement Cost $2,500 
     Value Added Work $400 
     Non-value Added Work  
      Waste  $800 
      Necessary Waste $0 
    
Total SUAV Asset and Liabilities $191,500 
 
TestTotal Cost = AFRLReview Cost + AFFTCReview Cost + TEcost 
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4.1.2  Initial Cost Results 
As previously emphasized, it is important to recognize that these monetary values 
are presented with significant assumptions based on empirical observations of only 
somewhat similar situations befitting an exploratory research such as this. From the data 
presented, with an average total value of $191,500 in SUAV asset and liabilities, the total 
AFFTC review costs ($3,700) did not represent any substantial impact to the total value 
of the SUAV. Not only was the AFFTC review cost less than anticipated, the average 
reviewing time was much shorter than previously expected.  
With regards to flight mishap data from the AFRL T&E Office (Appendix C), 
SUAV flights from 2011 had nine flights mishaps with a total of over $625,000 in 
damages, which translated into an average of $69,400 per flight mishap. Additionally, 
data from the AFRL T&E Office showed an average of five (5) working days for a return 
to flight approval from AFFTC upon learning of a mishap. In two mishap instances, the 
return to flight processing time AFFTC took to approve was three working days and six 
working days, respectively. By using similar assumptions and estimates on cost, these 
five working days had an estimated process cost of a little over $2,000 for a return to 
flight approval from AFFTC. Again, the average time and cost of a return to flight 
approval from AFFTC was insignificant compared to the total cost in mishap damages.   
In summary, the cost measurement analysis from the data given suggested that the 
process time and process cost from the AFFTC review was considerably less than 
previously expected. Moreover, the time to approve a return to flight following a mishap 
was reasonably less in terms of cost and time. This initial cost analysis shows that the 
AFFTC involvement in AFRL flight tests may be beneficial and instrumental in 
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mitigating AFRL flight mishaps, considering SUAV flight tests in 2011 had experienced 
a mishap with over $69,000 in damages for each mishap. The extra review at the AFFTC 
may cause additional time and overhead costs for the test management organization, but 
in the long run, it may be valuable in providing comments and insights to the PMs and 
the test teams at AFRL, thereby possibly reducing future flight mishaps. This perceived 
value of extra small dollars and time to “buy” a decreased chance of failure may be 
enough to convince the PMs to spend the additional funds to mitigate mishaps. However, 
given the nature of R&D in UAV test flights, mishaps that cost a few hundred to a few 
thousand dollars are sometimes considered negligible and acceptable in favor of 
improved research.  
Additional interviews were conducted with the AFRL T&E Office as more details 
on AFFTC review process were revealed. One of the primary reasons why the approval 
processing time from AFFTC was cut shorter than what was anticipated at the beginning 
of this research was the personnel changes that took place in the 412th OG at AFFTC 
since the Homan et al. (2011) study. Personnel at the AFRL T&E Office noticed the trend 
in approval review was slashed to almost half that from previous submissions. The AFRL 
T&E Office also noticed there were no additional re-work or additional value added 
feedback from the FOA. This decreasing trend in approval time and the lack of in-depth 
reviews from AFFTC suggested either an absence of interest in SUAV flight test reviews 
from the new personnel, or that the new FOA has come to fully trust the flight test 
organizations at AFRL with simple SUAV tests and designs. In addition to the new FOA 
personnel at AFFTC, the AFRL T&E Office also welcomed in a new Chief, who is a Test 
Pilot School (TPS) graduate from Edwards AFB. Both organizations have seen an 
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increase in direct communication on issues relating to SUAV tests. Perhaps the 
experienced TPS graduate and new Chief at the AFRL T&E Office brings new skills or 
“value-added” to the process, hence the decreased time in the approval process.  
 
4.1.3  Cost Sensitivity Results 
There is difficulty in estimating cost evaluations, especially given sensitivities 
associated with the programs. These sensitivities include the design and operational 
parameters of the SUAVs. As shown in Figure 4.1, of the 22 SUAV flight test programs 
in 2011, nearly half were new and prototypes with variable costs to each program, none 
of which are dependent on their system maturity. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: System Maturity vs. Cost 
 
Figure 4.1 also shows that costs are not sensitive to system maturity, but rather to 
the payloads carried by these SUAVs. The cost of some of these SUAVs can be high, 
mostly due to their expensive payloads such as radar sensors and imaging capabilities. 
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Since the initial results and mishap data have shown high vulnerability for SUAV 
mishaps at an average of $69,400 in losses, PMs and test teams are recommended to have 
initial estimates on the program’s feasibility and categorize test requirements in phases of 
testing in order to reduce risks to program cost. These phases of testing and development 
should be separated into a list of “must haves” and “good to haves” with user 
prioritization that can be used to conduct trade-off at later stages of acquisition 
development. These phases of testing and development should minimize cost 
uncertainties, whereas an “all-in-one” package (i.e., one expensive payload on a SUAV) 
may present a higher risk to cost should a mishap occur. This recommendation is in 
agreement with the industrial practice of involving customers early in program 
requirements with clear communication to separate their needs into “must haves” and a 
“wish list” (CNSTAT et al., 2011). CNSTAT et al. (2011) also recognizes some 
flexibility that allows for modifications responsive to users’ needs and changing 
environments. However, any changes to program requirements can result in considerable 
cost increases and schedule delays.  
A substantial part of the many levels of safety reviews in the USAF is the 
structure of accountability in the design and development of the system. A system that 
has mature technologies will likely experience safer operation than those that have 
immature systems. With SUAV payload costs that sometimes exceed the cost of the 
vehicle, it becomes a question of technology maturity of the SUAV itself. Technology 
immaturity such as those of SUAVs coupled with an expensive payload will certainly 
cause scrutiny in reviews. According to CNSTAT et al. (2011), technology immaturity is 
known to be a primary cause of schedule slippage and cost growth in DoD program 
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acquisition. The success of a system maturity strategy depends on the consistent and 
continuous definition of requirements and the maturation of technologies. This 
“evolutionary acquisition” or a spiral acquisition approach to transition new technology 
to operational capability is reflected in the DoD Instruction 5000.2. The objective of 
evolutionary acquisition is to balance the needs and available capability with resources, 
and to put capability into the hands of the user quickly (DoD AT&L).  
In summary, system maturity costs were varied with SUAV performance and 
payload cost. To minimize large mishap costs, a priority list of “must haves” and “good 
to haves” should be implemented and decided on what and when to test first instead of 
putting all eggs in one basket and risk it all from system failure. 
4.2  Value Stream Mapping Analysis 
 Value Stream Mapping (VSM) examines the business process and seeks to 
understand and improve such efforts. While this study does not focus on the efficiency of 
the process, it does examine the necessity of the extra reviews at AFFTC and the cost 
benefit of having such reviews. As Homan et al. (2011) described in the present-state 
VSM, it was apparent that one of the larger areas of waste was the specific loops between 
the different stakeholders (i.e., program managers) and the AFRL T&E Office. Other 
problems revealed by Homan et al. (2011) included the lack of initial notifications of 
pending tests and the absence of standardization in the test plans when submitted for 
approval. The five main problems identified by Homan (2011) were: 
 
1. Late notification and/or non-standard work (test plans or safety packages) 
by PMs 
2. Firefighting and heroics by AFRL T&E Office 
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3. Bottleneck at FOA (high throughput and low capacity) 
4. Lack of expected target timeline and non-standard work (mishap report) 
for return-to-flight process 
5. Lack of transparency throughout processes for all stakeholders 
 
In quantifying the present-state VSM and the cost measurements which were 
discussed in the previous result, initial data suggested that AFFTC involvement in AFRL 
flight tests may be beneficial in providing feedback and mitigating mishaps given that the 
costs and time required were miniscule compared to the total cost of the UAV program. 
However, further analysis was needed to verify and determine the threshold at which 
AFFTC involvement in low risk test plans adds value and that the extra review is 
desirable even though it presents a fairly minimal investment in time and cost to the 
program. Conversely, this threshold will also need to show that AFFTC’s involvement in 
low cost programs are sometimes inapplicable because of SUAV costs and complexity, 
and any program that falls below this threshold may not require additional reviews at 
AFFTC. 
 
4.2.1  Data Variability 
In this portion of the analysis, a Variation Simulator developed by the Lean 
Advancement Institute (LAI) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lean 
Academy was used to measure the impacts of variation on cycle time in the approval 
process. The intention of the variability simulation is to assess the impact that variability 
has on process performance. Any variability in the simulation value is used for the 
purpose of predicting relative differences in task execution at a particular step. Such 
 58 
simulation is not designed to cast judgment or predict performance at AFFTC or AFRL 
T&E Office.  
Reducing process variation is a key component in process improvement 
methodologies such as lean Six Sigma. In an ideal process flow, where the input rate is 
equal to or less than that of the output rate at every task, the flow should not experience 
any delays and the process is deemed fully utilized. However, when variations in the 
process are considered, the process begins to experience delays and work begins to 
accumulate at various tasks. For the sake of simplicity, the process flow begins when the 
PM submits a draft test plan to the AFRL T&E Office, which then begins the safety and 
technical coordination approval process internally at AFRL and externally at AFFTC. 
Once the approval process is complete, test execution can begin.  
As demonstrated in Figure 4.2, the simulation assumed no output rate variations at 
the AFRL T&E Office nor the review authority panels; however, the PM station had 
variations per day in submitting test plans to the AFRL T&E Office. These test plans 
were varied from one to five per day, which could represent a lack of notifications of 
pending tests and lack of standardization in the test plans. These variations coming from 
the PM had the most direct impact on the AFRL T&E Office. Hence, the workload 
depicted in Figure 4.2 shows the accumulated test plans at the AFRL T&E Office over 
time when its capacity could only produce three test plans per day. 
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Figure 4.2: Variation at Program Management 
 
Homan et al. (2011) mentioned that the AFRL T&E Office was unable to 
eliminate the constant late notifications or tardy test packages arriving from the program 
manager, in addition to the non-standardized test packages. Homan et al. (2011) also 
discussed the effect of “firefighting” at the AFRL T&E Office where members defer 
resources to problematic (or late) programs and work harder to meet requirements and 
push completed programs to the next station. This effect causes the information to get 
“pushed” instead of “pulled.” According to McManus (2005), information flow should be 
pulled, not pushed. In other words, information should flow when it is needed by 
downstream processes, not when upstream processes are done. Repenning et al. (2001) 
also added that occasional “firefighting” may offer short-term gains, but these temporary 
gains will come at the expense of the long-run flow of the entire process. Firefighting can 
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also create bottlenecks for the downstream process, especially when the later process 
steps have variation, which possibility is discussed in the next simulation.  
As shown in Figure 4.3, the FOA at AFFTC had variations in approving SUAV 
test plans coming from AFRL. One of the main problems identified earlier was the 
bottleneck at the FOA in the overall process (Homan et al., 2011). This bottleneck was 
caused by the increasing number of test packages that were pushed to the FOA from the 
AFRL T&E Office, resulting in variations in approval time. In many instances where 
programs were deemed low risk, only a single approval authority at the AFFTC handled 
all of the test packages from AFRL. The problem was even worse when the single FOA 
at AFFTC was also responsible for nine other local test organizations. These notional 
results show that the pushed information was not needed by the recipient in the 
downstream process, and it would certainly not flow “at the right time” for PMs to 
execute their tests on schedule.  
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Figure 4.3: Bottleneck at AFFTC 
 
In all simulations conducted with variations of at least one task, the test execution 
schedule was greatly affected. The simulation could continue with multiple variables at 
different tasks, but the purpose was to demonstrate the process behavior over a long 
period of time. With reduced input variability and process variability, the simulation 
shows improvement in the flow process and allows stations to have excess capacity to 
pull work. Eliminating variability also allows straight-through flow to meet customer 
(i.e., program managers) demands.  
McManus (2005) specifies that bottlenecks can be caused by effects external to 
the process, such as the lack of resources, information, or authority to proceed. Such 
effects coincide with the current-state of the AFRL/AFFTC approval process. That is, if 
there is a lack of resources, typically the FOA personnel are not available to start a task 
and the task waits, thus creating a bottleneck. If the externally-provided information is 
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not available, typically because of the inadequate test plans from the PM, the tasks either 
wait or proceed with “bad” information (i.e., firefighting) only to be reworked later (after 
mishaps). Finally, if external approval authority other than from AFFTC is required to 
proceed, and it is not forthcoming, the task will wait.  
 
4.2.2  Value Stream Mapping Results 
In summary, the results from VSM analysis conducted with data variability 
support the five major problems which were first identified by Homan et al. (2001). Not 
only does this study support the identified problems, it also postulates that, based on 
McManus’s VSM manual (2005) and through MIT’s Variation Simulator, bottlenecks are 
caused by effects external to the process. The variability simulation uncovered the heavy 
workload and firefighting support that the AFRL T&E Office displayed when PMs failed 
to follow standardized guidelines. This led to firefighting from the AFRL T&E Office 
which ultimately led to the bottleneck at AFFTC when more than enough tests plans were 
compiled at the FOA for approval. 
4.3  Acceptable Cost and Optimal Risk 
In this portion of the analysis, a notional optimal level of risk is created to 
evaluate the value of each risk factor before reaching an optimal level of risk and the 
deciding cost in flight testing them. Risk is usually expressed in terms of probability of 
occurrence and impact, which leads to dollars and time, and each project will have to 
control its own destiny through factoring the different indications of risks. SUAV flight 
mishaps may be all too common for PMs who have flight tested them and those who have 
the experience to explain why flight mishaps happen. As discussed earlier in the accident 
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rates of SUAVs, it is all too familiar to the DoD and the FAA. Therefore, they require a 
thorough review in flight personnel policy, training, and operations for SUAV tests. 
Figure 4.4 shows the balancing between the level of risks and the costs of a SUAV 
program to the optimal level of risk, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Acceptable and Optimal Risk  
(Morgan, 1981) 
 
4.3.1  Perceptual Factors in Assessing Risk  
From the previous analyses in cost measurement and variability, the cost of risk 
reduction at the AFFTC safety reviews have shown to be minimal compared to the 
overall costs of the entire program, suggesting that more reviews should be done to quell 
the increasing number of flight mishaps. Additionally, the time it took for additional 
reviews at AFFTC was less than anticipated, but that was because of recent personnel 
changes. Furthermore, personnel at AFFTC were experiencing variations in approving 
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low risk test plans when too many programs were pushed to the FOA for approval, 
causing major bottlenecks at AFFTC. 
In light of the two previous analyses, why would the PMs and the AFRL T&E 
Office want to de-scope the level of oversight from AFFTC on low risk programs given 
that the cost and time required for AFFTC to review them were not as high as originally 
thought? In other words, what is the reason why people are reluctant to perform risk 
analysis (i.e., mishap mitigations at AFFTC) for low risk programs when the process time 
is short and the cost is inexpensive? The key issue is one of perception. Cost 
measurement results show that the AFFTC processing time is organizational and 
personality-dependent—that personnel changes in the future may not have the same test 
plan approval rate, thus adding the uncertainty in the overall process. Additionally, the 
PMs and the AFRL T&E Office felt that there was no value added at the AFFTC review 
process. 
So why do SUAV programs have to spend a few thousand dollars and an extra 
week to get the approval from AFFTC when there is no perceived value added from the 
AFFTC review process? The answer lies in the optimal level of risk that the PM is 
willing to take. This optimal level of risk taking is non-quantitative and must be based on 
the perceptual factors that are relevant to the assessment of risk, as identified by Hillson 
and Hulett (2004). 
 
1. Familiarity: The extent to which an individual, team, or organization has 
previously encountered the situation drives whether the risk probability is 
perceived as high or low. Where there is little or no previous relevant 
experience, skill or knowledge, the degree of uncertainty is perceived as 
higher than that case when it is assessed by individuals or groups who 
have come across the situation before. 
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2. Manageability. The degree of control or choice that can be exercised in a 
given situation drives the assessment of uncertainty, even if the perception 
is illusory. Where a risk is seen as susceptible to control, risk probability 
is assessed as lower than in situations where controllability or choice are 
absent (or perceived to be so). 
3. Proximity. If the possible occurrence of a risk is close in time or space to 
those assessing its probability, it will be seen as more likely than risks 
which might occur later in time or further away in space. 
4. Propinquity. This term is used to describe the perceived potential for the 
consequences of a risk to affect the individual or group directly. The 
closer the impact is to those assessing the risk, the higher its perceived 
probability is. 
 
 
These factors are hard to recognize and address, as they and other perceptual 
influences operate subconsciously when individuals and teams assess risk probability and 
category (Hillson & Hulett, 2004). Another critical reason why low risk programs have to 
go through AFFTC approval review is to hold accountability and responsibility in the 
program; these “ways of seeing and understandings” of risk in organizational settings 
were seen as methods of deferring blame to any single organization with respect to issues 
of risk and responsibility (Hutter & Power 2005). After all, organizations’ and 
individuals’ interests may vary, but they address issues in test flights through 
considerations of commonalties in risk management.  
 
4.3.2  Heuristics and Biases in Risk Assessment 
 In assessing risk, other factors that influence the PMs’ decisions in the perception 
of risk are known as heuristics or rules-of-thumb. Hillson and Hulett (2004) define 
heuristics as internal frames of reference used by individuals and groups to inform 
judgment when no firm data are available. Hillson and Hulett (2004) emphasize the 
influence of introducing two types of heuristic bias into assessments in situations of 
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uncertainty. The first type of bias is motivational bias, where the assessor seeks to 
improve the apparent position of the situation by modifying the estimate of risk 
probability. The second type of bias is cognitive bias, which arises from unconscious 
attempts to rationalize the lack of certain knowledge (Hillson & Hulett, 2004). Of these 
two biases, it is observed that motivational bias is perhaps more commonly found in PMs. 
The author also noticed in the various interviews that PMs were more likely to exhibit 
motivational bias. This is a purely anecdotal impression from the author and this has no 
hard data to quantify this effect. 
Motivational bias is difficult to identify and manage as the person or organization 
assessing the risk has an interest in influencing the results of the analysis (Hillson & 
Hulett, 2004). SUAVs are distinct by their sizes, costs, and complexity. These factors 
often define the risk of their test flights. The presumption of motivational bias usually 
makes the probability of the risk of SUAVs seem to be smaller than what it really is, 
especially in order to reduce the perception of risk among key stakeholders. It is observed 
that PMs will use the notion of their SUAVs as being small, lightweight, and inexpensive 
to de-value the purpose of any extra safety reviews that may cause their programs to 
incur more costs and time. Granted, it is true from the data gathered that most SUAV 
programs were deemed as low risk, but the cost sensitivity in the payloads carried by 
SUAVs were often the deciding factor in categorizing risks. 
 
4.3.3  Notional Optimal Level of Risk 
From these perceptual and heuristics factors, PMs will argue that the absence and 
noninvolvement from AFFTC may create a reduction in the cost of risk abatement, which 
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reduces the total costs and time incurred from the flight approval process and SUAV 
operation. This reduction will create a new cost of risk abatement and a new optimal level 
of risk, as shown in Figure 4.5.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Notional Optimal Level of Risk (without AFFTC involvement) 
 
This noninvolvement from AFFTC in low risk programs will be manifested by 
AFFTC giving full approval authority on low risk tests to the AFRL T&E Office. Not 
only would this new level of risk abatement reduce the time and costs for the PMs at 
AFRL, but it would also give the reviewers at AFFTC more time to perform their main 
duties at AFFTC, given that the FOA’s main duties come from the flight test 
organizations at AFFTC. Furthermore, since 90% of the tests coming from AFRL are low 
risk, it would assume that the costs are low and the risks can be negated. Additionally, the 
data variability analyses have shown a bottleneck at AFFTC when the FOA experiences 
 68 
variation in approving SUAV test plans coming from AFRL. This new optimal level of 
risk results in a lesser total cost, and its expected losses from risk is even less due the 
overall factors from the PM’s presumption in the motivational bias and heuristic 
approaches. This notional optimal level of risk will be carried to the latter section of this 
chapter to create a notional common threshold and decision rule matrix. 
Noninvolvement from AFFTC would certainly increase the number of SUAV 
programs and increase R&D in SUAVs and their systems. However, risks are still 
inherently apparent to the PMs and the flight testers. Every project is unique and SUAV 
projects are no different when it comes to safety. The mishap rate is still high, and the 
technologies to improve SUAV safety records are still being developed; therefore, it is 
prudent to approach testing with attentiveness when no AFFTC involvement is granted. 
 
4.3.4  A What-if Scenario 
The problems of unintended consequences are high whether the program is 
categorized as low risk or not. Flight testers are fully aware that most of the accidents 
happen between test points or on low risk activities (Ward et al., 2006). Rules and 
regulations are in place for a reason, but in times of budget crunches, there is always 
pressure to eliminate unnecessary work and waste when results confirm non-added value 
work. However, when it comes to proper leadership (AFMC/A3, 2006), the thought was 
not in terms of what the testers in the T&E community characterize as low, medium, or 
high risk, but the thought stemmed from accountability and responsibility terms—that all 
flying incurs some level of risk and proper supervision is better to measure and mitigate 
risks. In an evocative scenario, it would be extremely uncomfortable and an 
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embarrassment for the test team to explain to leadership about how a low risk mission 
flown by an AFRL contractor experienced a Class A mishap when the mishap 
investigation revealed that no rated Operations Group Commander (O-6) oversight was 
discussed, as dictated by the MOA between AFRL and AFFTC. This thought-vignette 
was one of the arguments against an improvement initiative from both AFRL and AFFTC 
to reduce the scope of AFFTC oversight on low risk programs, and was quickly rejected 
at AFMC/A3. It is the very same reason why the MOA was put in place at the beginning 
of the joint AFRL/AFFTC flight safety reviews. 
 
4.3.5  Managing Risk Results 
 One of the challenging outcomes of risk assessment is that it is difficult to 
objectively quantify risks. Hence, the qualitative results discussed two main objectives. 
Two questions were answered in the optimal risk analysis section: Why is there a drive to 
de-scope the AFFTC oversight of low risk programs when AFFTC time and cost to 
review were short and less expensive than originally thought? And why do SUAV 
programs have to spend a few thousand dollars and the extra week to get the approval 
from AFFTC when there is no value added to the program? This research has also 
included the top level acceptable cost of optimal risk analysis in which the perceptual 
factors and heuristic factors were taken into account to determine whether or not the extra 
reviews at AFFTC is necessary. Motivational bias was seen as a tool that most PMs 
would use to assess risks on their programs based on the notion that their SUAVs were 
small, inexpensive, and can be replaced with commercial-off-the-shelf parts. The results 
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from cost measurement analysis, variability analysis, and optimal risk analysis will be 
tied together to come up with a threshold and reach a decision rule in the next section. 
4.4  AFFTC Threshold and Decision Rule 
 This part of the chapter will sum the previous three analyses and determine a 
recommendation for an acceptable threshold which would help PMs at test organizations 
reach a decision rule on a flight test approval process for SUAVs. According to Hillson 
(2004), an acceptable threshold defines a target against which the effectiveness of 
responses can be measured. Without such a target, too much effort might be spent on 
mitigating risk beyond what would be acceptable, or reviews might not go far enough in 
reducing threats and enhancing opportunities (Hillson, 2004). 
Several considerations and assumptions were made when attempting to estimate a 
notional cost balance statement for SUAVs. From previous estimates, the total SUAV 
assets and liabilities came to about $191,500 for a low risk program. This is roughly the 
same as a Class C mishap definition, which is the total cost of property damage, 
including all aircraft damage between $10,000 and $200,000. In addition to monetary 
loss, Class C mishaps also involve injuries that result in five or more workdays lost. 
Because of the approximate SUAV cost assets and liabilities, it is recommended that the 
decision rule threshold for cost remain at $200,000. The justification behind this cost 
threshold is that it holds true to the average cost of the SUAV flight test and anything less 
than $200,000 in total assets and liabilities is deemed a Class C mishap should an 
accident happen. In addition to the cost threshold, there is the size and weight of the 
SUAV’s airframe to consider should it crash to the ground and cause injury and damage 
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to people and property. A notional threshold in SUAV size and weight will also 
determine whether the program should go to the extra review at AFFTC.   
 It is unknown if the DoD or the FAA have rules and regulations for SUAVs based 
on their size and kinetic energy. However, research from other non-military agencies, 
such as the JAA and EUROCONTROL (2004), has proposed a cut-off line with respect 
to SUAV size and kinetic energy at impact. The JAA/EUROCONTROL reviewed the 
worldwide UAV fleet and judged the capability of existing SUAV models on their 
workload, masses, kinetic energy, airspeed, and UAV operator’s ability. The report 
proposed a guideline for the regulation of SUAV systems. Generally, most UAVs less 
than 150 kg are classified as light or SUAV systems (JAA, Weibel & Hansman, 2004). 
These SUAVs do not have to comply with the same regulations as manned aircraft, yet 
do not qualify as model aircraft in Europe. However, they are required to operate within 
restrictions, such as daylight operations and within the visual range of the operator, and in 
restricted airspace (JAA, 2004). Larger UAVs weighing more than 150 kg, with a kinetic 
energy at impact of more than 95 kJ flying in unrestricted airspace or outside the visual 
range of the operator will be required to be flight tested and approved in a similar manner 
to that of manned aircraft (JAA, 2004).  
 
4.4.1  Notional Threshold 
Based off of the notional cost threshold and the proposal from the 
JAA/EUROCONTROL report, this research proposes using the same standard and 
regulation based on the size and energy criteria as that of the JAA/EUROCONTROL, and 
recommends that the DoD and FAA adopt the same technique, or something similar. 
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Figure 4.6 provides a notional decision rule matrix incorporating size and energy criteria 
as it pertains to the evaluation of SUAV flight test approval process. The notional 
decision rule matrix is flexible and can be used given the dependencies of many heuristic 
factors based on risk assessment and the experience that comes with it. These factors 
include the environment in which the SUAV is flown, the maturity of the system, and the 
product weight, size, speed, and complexity. The decision rule matrix assumes that the 
SUAVs are flown in restricted airspace.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Notional Threshold 
 
The framework for adoption of this decision matrix is based on the fact that low 
cost SUAVs with simplistic designs should require less review time. The framework also 
allows the test team and those at AFFTC and AFRL to assess the risks involved in some 
of these SUAV programs before a decision is reached. It provides test teams a notional 
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“tipping point” where AFFTC safety reviewers would essentially add value to the flight 
approval process. For example, the FOA may spend a greater amount of time on 
programs that are high cost and/or the systems involved are larger than the average sized 
UAV that is usually tested.  
 
4.4.2  Notional Decision Rule Matrix and Outcome 
Sometimes, decision-making follows a simple rule; people view the problem in a 
stereotyped way and often determine if the given situation is common or familiar based 
on their past experiences (Klein, 1998). Likewise, if people decide that the situation is 
uncommon or unfamiliar, then they follow an alternate safer decision (Klein, 1998). 
Quadrants 1 and 4 in the decision rule matrix clearly demonstrates Klein’s successful 
decision making model (1998), that the situation is either common (from past 
experiences) or uncommon (alternate safe decision). Quadrants 2 and 3 differ in their 
level of consequences, as the decision is to have either the extra review or no extra 
review. Quadrant 2 is deemed acceptable in daily operations because of its conservative 
decision which leads to low consequence (Klein, 1998). Quadrant 3 is not acceptable 
because it may lead to highly consequential damage or injury (Klein, 1998). Figure 4.7 
shows how decisions are made based on the PM’s experience with the program and the 
given situation. 
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Figure 4.7: Notional Decision Rule Matrix and Outcome  
(Modified from Klein, 1998) 
 
 
4.4.3  Meta-language and Heuristics 
 In order to better define the notional decision rule quadrant as shown in Figure 4.6 
and Figure 4.7, one may be inclined to describe risk using meta-language. Risk meta-
language is a structured description of a risk which separates cause, risk, and effect. 
Meta-language allows risk analysis to provide a three part structured risk statement that 
should ensure risk identification through a heuristic approach (Hillson, 2008).  The risk 
meta-language format can be written like this: “Because of [cause(s)], [risk] might occur, 
which would lead to [effect(s)].”  
 Causes are present facts or conditions which can give rise to risks (Hillson, 2008). 
Once the cause is identified, one can determine the risk by asking “so what?” which 
would lead to a decision on the uncertainties about the cause. The effects stem from the 
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conditional future state that the risk decision produces. With respect to the notional 
decision rule quadrant, the risk meta-language can be written in four separate formats for 
each quadrant, as shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Meta-Language and Decision Rule 
 
1. “Because my UAV program is expensive and its impact energy is high [cause], I 
should increase my time and resources in risk reduction [risk decision], which should 
lead to low mishap probability and no losses [effect].” This meta-language implies 
the UAV program is expensive and heavy at impact, to which the PM would make the 
decision to have the extra review at AFFTC in order to mitigate future risks. 
2. “Because my UAV program is expensive and its impact energy is low [cause], I 
should make some effort in risk reduction [risk decision], which should lead to low 
mishap probability and expect low losses [effect].” This meta-language implies that 
the UAV, although lightweight, is still expensive, which would lead the PM to invest 
a conservative amount in risk reduction at AFFTC in order to reduce future mishaps, 
which would otherwise cause the expensive UAV to crash and incur greater losses. 
The effect is a lower expected loss due to the initial risk reduction effort. 
3. “Because my UAV program is inexpensive but its impact energy is high [cause], I 
should not invest too much time and effort in risk reduction [risk decision], which 
may yield high mishap probability from risk [effect].” This meta-language suggests 
that the UAV, although heavy, is inexpensive and probably simple to build. The risk 
decision is to forgo with the extra review due to its inexpensiveness; however, the PM 
should expect the risk of failure (mishaps) to be high since it does not go through the 
extra review. 
4. “Because my UAV program is inexpensive and its impact energy is low [cause], I 
should not invest too much time and effort in risk reduction [risk decision], which 
could lead to medium or low probability of a mishap [effect].” This meta-language 
suggests that the UAV is inexpensive and lightweight, therefore, the PM should not 
need the extra review before flying, however, the probability of a mishap is minimum 
or low due to the lack of reviews.   
 
An area of concern in the decision rule is where SUAVs exceed the proposed 
mass and kinetic energy at impact criteria but they are under the $200,000 threshold 
(decision quadrant 3). The big mass and high kinetic energy at impact may present a 
hazardous flying experience should a mishap occur on the ground with injury to 
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personnel involved. This would create a cautious choice for all personnel involved in 
deciding whether or not AFFTC is needed and if it would add any significant safety 
comments in the safety review process. Therefore, this framework and decision rule is 
based on an experienced judgment and heuristic ability of the UAV operator and the test 
team to control the vehicle. 
 In summary, risk meta-language is a useful tool for clarifying risk descriptions. 
The simple three-part framework and decision rule offer general guidelines and rule-of-
thumb principles that an experienced PM may be able to find risk, uncertainties, and the 
effects of risk decisions. There is no best approach in making a decision in whether or not 
to add the extra review from AFFTC. The best approach may be answered with “it 
depends.” It depends on the cost of the UAV, the level of sophisticated hardware 
involved in the UAV, the level of details and complexity of the risk process, and any 
external factors that play in UAV test flights.  
4.5  Application of Notional Threshold and Decision Rule Matrix 
 After collecting SUAV data with total cost, mass, and impact energy (see 
Appendix C), this research plots 16 AFRL SUAV programs using the notional threshold 
and decision rule matrix for further analysis, as shown in Figure 4.8. Notice that the 
majority of the SUAV programs from 2011 were lightweight (less than 150 kg) and less 
than $200,000. As seen in Figure 4.8, one SUAV program had cost, weight, and kinetic 
energy which exceeded the notional threshold. This program experienced a flight mishap, 
which was probably caused by the vehicle’s immaturity as data showed that the vehicle 
had less than one hour of total flying time. Another SUAV (quadrant 2) cost more than 
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$200,000, but its mass and kinetic energy were less than the notional threshold; it also 
experienced a mishap. However, unlike the SUAV mishap in quadrant 1, this vehicle had 
more flying time and was considered mature. The third SUAV mishap (quadrant 4) was 
under the cost threshold and proposed mass and kinetic energy. This particular vehicle 
was considered mature with four sorties and over nine hours of total flying time.  
 
 
Figure 4.8: 2011 SUAV Flight Tests 
 
 Based on the limited data and the three mishaps given, the above figure shows 
that there is no correlation between flight mishaps and an SUAV’s cost and their physical 
sizes and energy. Nor there is any correlation between system maturity (total flying 
times) and flight failures. Figure 4.8 also shows that the majority of SUAVs submitted for 
flight testing are less than $200,000 and below that of the proposed mass and kinetic 
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energy threshold. Furthermore, AFRL mishap data from previous years shown in Figure 
4.9 reveals that the majority of mishaps were deemed as Class E events, which are 
occurrences that do not meet reportable mishap classification criteria, but are important to 
investigate and report for mishap prevention. A total of 46 mishaps were Class E events, 
eight were considered as Class C mishaps, and only one resulted in a Class B mishap 
from 2007 to 2012.  
 
 
Figure 4.9: AFRL Mishaps by Fiscal Year 
 
Essentially, SUAVs are sometimes prone to system failure; therefore, the flight 
approval process for SUAVs should be based on the judgmental cost and the proposed 
mass and impact energy. After all, SUAVs are still a relatively new platform with many 
opportunities for research and development. An appealing aspect of SUAV development 
is the fact that the majority of AFRL SUAVs are inexpensive, simple, and tiny to build 
and assemble versus larger UAVs or manned aircraft.  
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With a total cost less than or equal to $200,000 and a small and light weight 
airframe, an experienced SUAV operator could fly the SUAV without experiencing a 
mishap or cause extensive damage to people and property. Therefore, in consideration of 
an SUAV program, it should not necessarily adhere to the extra scrutiny that takes extra 
time and spends additional resources of the flight test team. Innovations and 
breakthrough technologies should not be hampered by policy for the sake of a $200,000 
or less mishap. However, for programs that are well over $200,000, its size and 
complexity make them a primary target for safety reviews. Therefore, it is within reason 
to have the extra reviews and operational authority to approve the flying machine.  
4.6  Summary 
 This chapter has presented the results and analysis from data gathered from the 
flight test offices. Starting with the cost measurement analysis and the notional cost 
balance statement for an average SUAV program, the initial results revealed that the total 
time and cost in AFFTC review did not present a significant investment in time and 
money from the test team at AFRL. Although the cost and time were minimal, having the 
additional feedback from the FOA at AFFTC may also add some risk mitigations to the 
test plan. However, further interviews with the AFRL T&E Office revealed that the 
feedback coming from AFFTC often lacks interest and value to the test plan. 
Additionally, cost sensitivity analysis results confirmed that SUAV program costs are not 
sensitive to system maturity, but rather to the payloads carried by the SUAVs. Data from 
the variability analysis confirmed that there was heavy workload and firefighting support 
at the AFRL T&E Office when PMs and test teams failed to submit standardized test 
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plans on time with adequate notifications of upcoming tests. Variability simulation 
showed a bottleneck at the AFFTC support due to the push effect caused by accumulated 
tests and late notifications from the AFRL T&E Office. Lastly, a top level risk analysis 
was conducted using perceptual factors and heuristic factors to determine whether or not 
the extra reviews at AFFTC were necessary. A notional optimal level of risk, including 
the noninvolvement from AFFTC, which decreased the total costs and time incurred in 
the flight approval process and SUAV operation was developed, but includes a cautious 
warning.  
Finally, in combining all three earlier analyses, this study creates a top-level 
AFFTC threshold and decision rule recommendation, which was determined from the 
average $200,000 SUAV program cost and the weight and impact energy of the SUAV. 
The decision rule quadrant and the successful decision model should allow the test team 
and those at AFFTC and AFRL to assess the risks involved in SUAV programs before a 
decision is reached. It also allows test teams to determine a “tipping point” where AFFTC 
safety reviewers would essentially add value to the overall flight approval process. 
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V.  Discussions and Conclusions 
 
This chapter provides discussions and conclusions based on results and analysis 
of this research. Recommendations are provided with a threshold and decision rule 
approach in the critical chain of SUAV flight approval process. Meta-language and 
heuristics are used to identify and describe risks by separating the causes from uncertain 
events. The following section summarizes recommendations for SUAVs’ flight approval 
process and their typical characteristic attributes which include being inexpensive, 
simple, and often fast to acquire. Next, this chapter wraps up with the research objectives 
and answers the questions that were asked in the introductory chapter. Additional 
observations are made on risk management by leadership and the lack of buy-in from 
leadership to allow AFRL to have full authority on low risk programs. Lastly, this chapter 
summarizes its conclusions with limitations for this study and suggestions for future 
research. 
5.1  Capturing Research Objectives 
 This study provided an overarching analysis of the SUAV flight test process 
currently used by AFRL with oversight from AFFTC. The objective was to establish a 
measure of benefit for an abbreviated flight test process. While the objective has been 
met with the notional decision rule matrix, along with ranges for the cut-off cost and 
SUAV size and impact energy. However, it also revealed a management approach that is 
difficult to quantitatively measure, and requires years of program management and flight 
test experience in determining the risk of forgoing AFFTC involvement.  
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In approaching transparency and improving safety reviews of the flight test 
program, multiple layers of safety reviews add benefits to mishap mitigation and 
accountability, yet they may be time consuming for PMs who want to accelerate their 
tests. Therefore, is it necessary for SUAVs to have the same criteria applied as that of a 
larger, manned aircraft in flight test approval process? The short answer is yes and no. 
Safety and accountability are two critical issues in flight testing; however, they should 
not create an environment in which innovation and development are held back because of 
a simple mishap from a low risk test plan. This leads to another question which was 
raised at the beginning of this study: Do SUAVs have to go through the same mishap 
investigation and reporting process? Evidence from AFRL T&E Office has suggested 
that these mishaps were minimal, and sometimes they were expected. There is no doubt 
that flight safety and mishap mitigations are applied at every step of the flight approval 
process, as instructed in numerous AFIs concerning flight testing. Some of these mishaps 
can be as simple as a crash landing on an unpaved runway that caused damage to the 
propeller of the SUAV, but it still resulted in weeks of mishap investigation and going 
through the return to flight approval process. Nevertheless, not all mishaps are minute; a 
program at threshold price of $200,000 with expensive payload would certainly raise 
concerns if there was no oversight on safety reviews from an appropriate authority.  
In contrast to the traditional military standards on SUAV flight tests, the DoD 
ought to look into research from non-military specifications. This study has developed a 
notional decision rule based on the proposed JAA/EUROCONTROL (2004) technique on 
SUAV weight and kinetic energy at impact. The consequences of using such a technique 
would simplify the SUAV flight test approval process and could save money in the long 
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run. With a simplified approval process, R&D organizations might be able to increase 
and expedite the weapons development needed for the warfighters. This coincides with 
the current DoD policy of supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
missions globally. Moreover, an abbreviated approval process for an SUAV is greatly 
needed for rapid reaction and rapid deployment to the theatre of operation to support the 
warfighters, as opposed to the generic flight test approval process. 
Additionally, data from cost sensitivity and variability analyses showed that 
system maturity costs were varied with SUAV payload costs. Program managers are 
always fighting system instability and the risk of uncertainties in the program. These 
uncertainties may be caused by outside influences such as technology, environment, and 
political and financial situations. By prioritizing a list of “must haves” and “good to 
haves,” test teams may be able to minimize the cost of the program and also make it more 
manageable in determining risks and use the decision rule to determine whether to 
include reviews by the AFFTC authority. The variability analysis showed a bottleneck 
occurring at the FOA due to variability in the process caused by the constant flooding of 
test packages coming from AFRL to the FOA. 
In summary, a generic standardized regulation for SUAVs may help the 
separation of risk assessment and risk management. Differentiating between the two may 
prove helpful in determining risk analysis when weighing the benefits of an abbreviated 
flight test process and the costs associated with going through the entire flight approval 
process. Using a current generic standardized regulation in flight test approval process 
may have the advantage of consistency, predictability, and administrative efficiency. 
However, there are also disadvantages in having SUAVs going through the same 
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standardized flight test approval process as those of larger manned aircraft. These 
disadvantages can include overgeneralizing SUAVs as having a complex integrated 
system like those of larger manned aircraft. Another disadvantage is the misallocation of 
resources and schedule; unlike larger manned aircraft, SUAVs are generally operated by 
a small team of engineers and observers. Lastly, by putting SUAVs through the same 
flight test approval process required of larger manned aircraft, there will be some delays 
which may eventually cause research and development to stop. This mixture of an overly 
unwieldy risk assessment policy and the potential for interrupted scientific research 
would probably cause delays and frustration for the PM and the test team. 
5.2  Impact of Leadership Risk Management Style 
One of the major surprises from this study was the unexpected perspective from 
AFRL on the lack of value and attention provided by AFFTC reviews. It should be noted 
that this study does not suggest that the FOA at AFFTC lacks the expertise to provide 
adequate reviews to the safety of the test missions. This study, however, advocates the 
notion of a “tipping point” where AFFTC safety reviewers would essentially add value to 
the overall flight approval process, as discussed in the previous chapter. This tipping 
point is determined using the notional decision rule matrix. With manning levels in the 
Air Force already strained, and the fact that 90% of AFRL’s flight test programs are 
considered by the AFRL and AFFTC as low risk, the level of authority and 
empowerment in low risk programs should be delegated to those personnel in the field. 
This delegation would greatly benefit both parties if low risk programs were approved at 
AFRL instead of AFFTC. It would also reduce the bottleneck problem at the FOA while 
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increasing opportunities for further flight testing by AFRL. Homan et al. (2011) also 
identified these issues and the potential opportunities to improve the flight test process. 
 A problem here lies in the risk adverse mismanagement style of leadership. Stulz 
(2009) and Taleb et al. (2009) discuss ways that organizations mismanage risk; one of 
them is the mistake of relying on historical data and becoming convinced that studying 
the past will help better manage risk in the future. In essence, leadership relies on these 
historical events (i.e., past mishaps from AFRL test flights) to control risk by predicting 
extreme events. However, low-probability, high-impact events are almost impossible to 
forecast, and “because of socioeconomic randomness, there is no such thing as a ‘typical’ 
failure or a ‘typical success’” (Taleb et al., 2009). Numerous joint AFFTC/AFRL 
proposals have been funneled up to leadership for the delegation of low risk programs to 
AFRL, yet their status is unknown or leadership refuses to consider them. This overly 
conservative risk management approach of leadership creates a non-empowered 
environment for those who want to test their programs and for those who review them. 
5.3  Conclusions 
This research effort sought to establish top-level quantitative and qualitative 
measures of benefit for an abbreviated flight test process for SUAVs. Issues such as cost 
sensitivity, process improvement, and risk management were discussed in this study. The 
literature review exposed performance gaps, cost and data variability, as well as buy-in 
from AFRL and AFFTC leadership to delegate low risk programs to AFRL; however, 
this was rejected due to the lack of accountability in small, low-risk AFRL programs. The 
literature also reviewed the importance of flight test and the factors that affect the 
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effectiveness of the flight testing. The increasing trends in SUAV technology 
development combined with the ever increasing DoD investment for SUAVs in the 
military has allowed greater R&D effort, yet it is sometimes limited and scaled back 
because of outdated policy and regulations on SUAV operations in the NAS and 
restricted airspace. The methodology section explained the research design for this study 
based on cost and time criteria, combined with data variability simulation and a heuristic 
approach to risk management. 
Research and development in new or un-tested technology often times is 
susceptible to additional risks, such as flight mishaps while airborne and during takeoff 
and landing. Often times, some form of risks in new R&D technologies may be 
acceptable in the pursuit of knowledge. For some risks, such as SUAV flight testing, it 
produces benefits to flyers and operators in the form of greater understanding of the 
vehicle’s flight characteristics and technological improvements. The findings from this 
research conclude with a SUAV threshold and decision rule matrix that will empower 
leadership to make decisions based on relevant data appropriate for SUAVs. 
5.4  Limitations and Future Research 
There is no doubt that the findings from this research are limited due to the 
assumptions that it has made. These limitations stem from the lack of adequate data in 
manpower and resources necessary to capture the entire SUAV business. A larger and 
broader examination of each SUAV program may give rise to improved assumptions. 
Another limitation is the data quality in this study, as such data are often limited in 
distribution due to the sensitivity of these programs. There are definitely more concerning 
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issues than what is captured in cost and SUAV weights and sizes in the flight test 
approval process. Approving routine and safe flight tests for SUAVs involve several 
issues that touch on nearly every aspect of the aviation field, including safety, security, 
air traffic, regulatory, and socio-economic. These categories should be addressed and 
assessed in future research to present a grander view of the factors and their impacts 
associated with SUAV flight tests. 
Although this study addresses some of the problems and shortcomings from both 
AFFTC and AFRL organizations and also provided a decision rule recommendation 
based on its methodology, there are still areas that can be improved and expanded upon. 
With better cost data from all previous years’ of AFRL flight test programs, future 
research would be improved on SUAV management costs and their estimates for further 
cost-benefit analysis. Another area of research that would greatly benefit the flight 
approval process for SUAVs is to study the variation of UAV sizes and costs and 
determine if there is variability in the processing time based on their sizes and 
manufacturing and operating costs.  
This research had difficulty determining the optimal level of risk when 
approaching the approval process in the critical chain. So the optimal level of risk and the 
new total cost presented in this study is merely an empirical experiment based on 
available data. Future research should utilize the notional optimal level of risk and 
determine the appropriate cost of risk abatement in order to find a more quantitative 
overall total cost and optimal level of risk. Future research should also conduct more 
appropriate interviews with the FOA at AFFTC, program leaders, and SUAV operators in 
the overall process. This is an area that would greatly benefit from further discussion and 
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could be broadened in future research that includes SUAV operators’ workload, 
situational awareness, and human effectiveness issues in SUAV operating environments. 
Lastly, since this research only focused on one flight test approval process being done per 
the MOA between AFFTC and AFRL, it is strongly recommended that future follow-on 
research should seek to generalize and validate this approach and methodology. 
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Appendix A:  Memorandum of Agreement between AFRL and AFFTC 
 
2006-06-06MA 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN 
AlRFORCERESEARCHLABORATORY 
AND 
AIR FORCE FLIGHT TEST CENTER 
I. PURPOSE. This memorandum of agreement is to establish a working relationship 
and J?rocesses to support the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC), 412th Test Wing, 
412 Operations Group operational control (OPCON) for all flight activities conducted 
by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). The AFRL has overall responsibility for 
program management and administrative support for its research programs. The AFFTC 
has responsibility for the safe and effective conduct of flight operations for AFRL 
research programs requiring flight activities. The AFMC/A3 defers OPCON to the 412th 
Operations Group Commander (OG/CC) for AFRL research programs involving military, 
government civilian or contractor flight operations. To avoid duplicate reviews, 
inspections or evaluations, an integrated team approach for conducting program flight 
operation oversight will be used. 
2. REFERENCES. The responsibilities of flying operations under the supervision of 
the AFFTC and the 412th Operations Group are detailed in Air Force Instructions. 
Ground and flight activities will comply with applicable regulatory guidance. 
Modifications of and exceptions to AFI guidance must be coordinated through the 412th 
OG/CC, in writing, to the designated Office of Primary Responsibility for the specific 
instruction. Below is a list of the primary Instructions applicable to flight operations. 
AFI 91-206(1) 
AFI 91-204 and AFMC Sup 1 
AFI 91-202 and AFMC Sup I 
AFFTCI 91-5 
AFI 99-103 and AFMC, AFRL supplements 
AFI 11-401 and AFMC Sup 1 
AFI 11-202 volwnes 1, 2, and 3; AFMC supplements 
AFI 11-2FT volumes 1, 2, and 3 
AFJI 10-220 and AFMC Sup 1 
AFI 10-206 
3. SCOPE. This agreement shall apply to military, government civilian and contractor 
flight operations regardless of program size or location of actual flight operations. 
4. RESPONSIBILmES. AFRL will continue to use processes in place for managinl 
its test programs as outlined in AFI 99-103 and its supplements. The AFFTC and 412 
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Operations Group will provide effective flight operations ove~sight of all AFRL test 
planning and flight execution. As clarification, the following specifics apply: 
4.1 AFRL RESPONSffiiLITIES. 
a. Provide the 412th OG with program procedures and documentation to meet the 
intent of AFI 11-401 and its AFMC and AFFTC supplements. 
1) Monthly, prior to the last day of any month, the AFRL will provide the 
412th OG with an electronic summary of all program flight activity 
accomplished by each program over the last month, and the scheduled 
flight activity expected for the next month. 
2) As a minimum, each program will be required to document individual 
flight authorizations using Aeronautical Orders, IMT Form 81 or IMT 
Form 5416 through the 412th OG. This will be accomplished even ifthe 
aircraft to be flown is not USAF owned. 
3) Daily flight authorization will be accomplished locally using the 
procedures detailed in AFI 11-401 and its AFMC and AFFTC 
supplements. The owning AFRL Division Chief will act as the flying 
squadron commander and authorize the daily flying schedule, with copies 
faxed to the 412th OG before flight. 
b. Provide the 412th OG with appropriate and sufficient evidence of aircrew and 
operator qualifications, training and currencies required to perform in-flight duties 
as detailed in the program test plan and to meet the intent of AFJ ll-202V1, V2, 
V3 and their AFMC and AFFTC supplements. 
1) The specific approval for in-flight duties will be given by the 412th OG. 
It is the AFRL program manager's responsibility for ensuring individuals 
performing any in-flight duties are certified as qualified and current. 
Modifications of and exceptions to AFI guidance must be coordinated 
through the 412th OG/CC, in writing, to the designated Office of Primary 
Responsibility for the specific instruction. 
2) AFRL programs that fly with airborne and/or ground station assets 
valued at over $200,000, is assessed as MEDIUM or HIGH risk or fly 
under an FAA approved Certificate of Authorization (COA) as outlined in 
FAA regulation 7610.4 will comply with all AFI 10 and 11 series 
instructions. 
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c. Provide a rated billet at AFRL for the AFITC to fill with a Major or 
Lieutenant Colonel acting as a local Test Representative representing the 412th 
Operations Group. Test Representative responsibilities will be detailed in the 
positionjob description. Duties will be determined collaboratively with AFRL 
and the 412th OG. 
d. Coordinate the technical and safety review information obtained through 
standard AFRL Configuration Control, Technical Review and Safety Review 
Board (CCB!TRB/SRB) processes with AFFTC organizations. 
I) For all AFRL research programs involving flight operations, copies of 
CCBrrRB/SRB packages and test plans will be provided to the 412th 
OG/CC at least fourteen days prior to the first planned test activity. More 
time may be required for review and coordination if the program is 
assessed by AFRL safety as MEDIUM or HIGH risk. 
2) AFFTCI 91-5 details the signature authority for LOW, MEDIUM and 
HIGH risk test plans for AFFTC programs and is modified below to 
support this MOA . 
. 
Oos Grouo CC or cauivalent Aoorove Info Info 
I Test WinR CC or cauivalenl Coord ADo rove Info 
I AFFTCCC Coord Coord Approve 
LOW rislc.test plans will be apfroved by the owning AFRL Division Chief or their Deputy 
and coordinated through 4121 OG before the start of any flight operations. MEDIUM 
rislc. test plans will be /ointly approved by the ow71ing AFRL Technical Directorate 
Director and the 4 I 2' TWICC. HiGH rislc. test plans will be jointly approved by the 
AFFTCICC and the AFRUCC. A formal approval briefing may be requested by the 
approval authority for any test plan, but is required for all HIGH rislc.test plans. All 
coordination comments will be resolved before final approval of test execution and made 
available to both AFFTC and AFRL leadership. 
3) AFFTCI 91-5 details the signature authority for LOW, MEDIUM and 
HIGH risk test cards for AFFTC programs and is modified to support thls 
MOA as follows: 
The test cards must be approved before each mission but no earlier than one week before 
the mission. For LOW RiSK tests, the AFRL Division Chief (or equivalent) will approve 
the cards. For MEDIUM RISK tests, the AFRL Technical Directorate Director and the 
412"' Operations Group Commander (or equivalent). will approve the cards. For HIGH 
RiSK tests. the AF RUCC and the 41 i" Test Wing Commander (or equivalent) will 
approve the cards. 
Once a mission is briefed and the mission slips due to a non-safoty related reason. but 
otherwise remains unchanged, the appropriate approving official may elect to grant 
approval by telephone or on an "until-flown" basis for up to one weelc. after original 
approval. If more than one weelc. has passed since the original approval, the approval 
authority must be contacted and the date on the signature updated. 
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4) Test conduct will otherwise comply with AFFTCI 91-5 procedures 
unless modified or equivalent procedures are approved through 
AFFTC/SET and the 412th OG/CC. 
e. Provide a Government Flight Representative (GFR) for all AFRL programs 
that fall under this MOA and require GFR oversight. The assigned GFR will 
coordinate with both the AFRL and 412th OG when performing their duties. 
f. Act as the lead agent and liaison with the 412th OG in all cases where 
configuration control and aircraft modifications affect the research program's test 
plan approved baseline configuration. 
4.2 AFFTC RESPONSffiiLITIES. 
a. Provide the AFRL with a flight authority review and approval of all flight 
activities to ensure AFRL test plans are conducted in accordance with applicable 
Federal Aviation Regulations and/or Air Force 10 and 11 series instructions and 
their AFMC and AFFTC Supplements. This responsibility·may be delegated to a 
Government Flight Representative (GFR) when required by contract. 
1) Process all waivers to governing regulations concerning flight test 
operations. 
2) Assist AFRL with establishing and approving pilot and operator 
qualification, training and currency standards for AFRL research programs 
involving flight activities to meet the intent of AFI ll-202Vl, V2, V3, 
AFI 11-2FTV1, V2, V3 and their AFMC and AFFTC supplements. 
3) Assist AFRL with establishing and approving flight authorization 
requirements for AFRL research programs involving flight activities to 
meet the intent of AFill-401 and its AFMC and AFFTC Supplements. 
4) Assist AFRL with establishing and executing an Operational Risk 
Management processes associated with AFRL research programs. 
5) Establish processes to provide AFRL research programs involving 
flight activities with the Flight Crew Information File (FCIF). 
b. 412th OG will provide AFRL aircraft mishap reporting and accountability 
assistance as the flight authority for all flight operations. Reporting and 
accountability will be in accordance with AFI91-202, 91-204 and 91-206(1) and 
AFMC and AFFTC supplements. 
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1) 412111 OG will be the grounding and return-to-fly approval authority for individuals involved in a Class A or Class B mishap. 
2) AFRL will retain mishap accountability and investigation 
responsibilities unless transferred IA W AFI guidance. 
c. Coordinate and approve the technical and safety review information obtained through AFRL Configuration Control, Technical RevieW and Safety Review Board (CCBfTRB/SRB) processes with AFFTC organizations to support AFRL 
research programs while complying with the intent of Air Force 91 and 99 series Instructions and their AFMC and AFFTC supplements. 
1) Provide safety and technical assistance for AFRL research programs that. are outside the expertise of AFRL. This may include, but is not limited to, providing a representative from within tbe 412• OG to attend program planning meetings, assist with the preparation of safety and/or technical documentation or attend TRB and/or SRB boards. · · 
2) For all MEDIUM and HIGH risk assessed test plans, a 412111 00 
member will be assigned to support the AFRL research program with test planning and integration with AFFTC technical, safety and flight test 
execution processes. 
5. TERM OF AGREEMENT AND RIGHT TO TERMINATE. This memorandum becomes effective on the date signed by both organizations and remains in effect indefinitely. Termination of this agreement is only valid if both the AFRllCC and the 412th 00/CC agree in writing to terminate the agreement Amendments to this agreement may be made with at least 90-days notification by either party, in writing, detail~g the procedures and processes to be amended. This agreement shall be reviewed annually. 
J4£/?@.5? 
TED F. BOWLDS, Maj Gen 
Commander, AFRL 
L D. NEW, Maj Gen 
· tor of Operations 
C.&~£'4 -CURTIS M.~ KE, Maj Gen 
Commander, AFFTC 
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Appendix C:  Small UAV Costs and Mishap Data 
SUAV  Cost Per Vehicle  Vehicles Flown  Total Amount  System Maturity  Sorties  Hours  Weight (kg)  Speed (m/s)  KE (KJ)  Mishaps  Quadrant 
Alpha 60   $                 800.00   7   $          5,600.00   Mature  78  20.33  7.7  24.7  2.3  4 
Alpha 60   $                 400.00   1   $              400.00   Mature  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Arrow MAV Glider   $             1,200.00   1   $          1,200.00   Prototype  6  0.3  0.9  8.7  0.0  4 
Basset   $         390,000.00   1   $      390,000.00   Prototype  3  0.9  317.5  61.7  604.3  Yes  1 
Bat‐3   $         318,000.00   1   $      318,000.00   New  18  44  14.5  30.9  6.9  Yes  2 
Big Stik   $             1,100.00   5   $          5,500.00   New  80  23.3  9  31.4  4.4  4 
Blacktip   $             6,200.00   2   $        12,400.00   Prototype  73  14.85  5.4  49.9  6.7  4 
BVM HiVast   $           28,000.00   1   $        28,000.00   New  12  1.5  31.7  102.9  167.8  3 
DG303   $           17,800.00   2   $        35,600.00   New  23  20.8  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Intimidator   $             1,100.00   5   $          5,500.00   New  35  12.9  9  44.8  9.0  4 
MOP MAV BDI   $           24,000.00   1   $        24,000.00   New  2  0.2  4.5  49.9  5.6  4 
Osprey (UAV)   $             2,333.00   7   $        16,331.00   Mature  40  22.15  27.2  33.4  15.2  4 
Radian RC   $                 250.00   1   $              250.00   Mature  7  0.3  0.9  8.7  0.0  4 
Rascal   $                 549.00   1   $              549.00   Mature  31  4.5  ‐  25.7  ‐  ‐ 
RMAX   $         380,000.00   2   $      760,000.00   Mature  0  0  93  11.3  5.9  2 
ScanEagle   $         100,000.00   1   $      100,000.00   Mature  1  1  20  41.2  17.0  4 
Silver Fox   $         100,000.00   1   $      100,000.00   Mature  4  9.5  16.3  28.3  6.5  Yes  4 
Skate   $           30,000.00   4   $      120,000.00   New  64  24.5  0.9  25.7  0.3  4 
Tandem Wing   $             3,000.00   2   $          6,000.00   Mature  7  0.6  ‐  14  ‐  Yes  ‐ 
Unicorn   $           17,000.00   1   $        17,000.00   Mature  39  15.9  4.5  24.7  1.4  4 
Unicorn   $           22,400.00   1   $        22,400.00   Mature  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Unicorn   $           18,700.00   3   $        56,100.00   Mature  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐     ‐ 
 $     1,462,832.00    $  2,024,830.00   523  218 
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SUAV Program Asset Cost  $133,000.00  $ 133,000.00 $66,500	x	2	SUAVs	
   
Test Execution Cost  $     30,000.00    $     30,000.00   Estimated	range	cost	
AFRL Review Cost 
     AFRL Risk Abatement Cost  $    2,054.79  $        2,100.00  1	GS‐15	with	5	working	days	($150K	salary)	
     Value Added Work  $  20,000.00  $     20,000.00   1	GS‐15	($150K	salary)	with	2	working	days	+	4	junior	member	($70K	salary)	with	25	working	days	
     Non-value Added Work 
          Waste  $        1,178.08   $        1,200.00  1	GS‐15	($150K	salary)	with	1	working	day	+	4	junior	members	($70K	salary)	with	1	working	day	
          Necessary Waste  $        1,534.25   $        1,500.00  4	junior	members	($70K	salary)	with	2	working	days	
AFFTC Review Cost  
     AFRL Risk Abatement Cost  $    2,465.75  $        2,500.00  1	O‐5	($150K	salary)	with	6	working	days	
     Value Added Work  $       410.96  $           400.00  1	O‐5	($150K	salary)	with	1	working	day	
     Non-value Added Work  
          Waste  $           821.92   $           800.00  1	O‐5	($150K	salary)	with	2	working	days	
          Necessary Waste  $                      ‐     $                      ‐   
         
Total UAV Asset and Liabilities  $   191,465.75  $   191,500.00 
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